University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2011

A Sustainable Autonomic Architecture for Organically
Reconfigurable Computing Systems
Rashad S. Oreifej
University of Central Florida

Part of the Computer Engineering Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information,
please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Oreifej, Rashad S., "A Sustainable Autonomic Architecture for Organically Reconfigurable Computing
Systems" (2011). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 6650.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/6650

A SUSTAINABLE AUTONOMIC ARCHITECTURE FOR ORGANICALLY
RECONFIGURABLE COMPUTING SYSTEMS

by

RASHAD S. OREIFEJ
B.S. UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN, 2000
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, 2006
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Engineering
in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in the College of Engineering and Computer Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2011

Major Professor: Ronald F. DeMara

© 2011 Rashad S. Oreifej

ii

ABSTRACT
A Sustainable Autonomic Architecture for Organically Reconfigurable Computing System based
on SRAM Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is proposed, modeled analytically,
simulated, prototyped, and measured. Low-level organic elements are analyzed and designed to
achieve novel self-monitoring, self-diagnosis, and self-repair organic properties. The prototype
of a 2-D spatial gradient Sobel video edge-detection organic system use-case developed on a
XC4VSX35 Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter Kit is presented. Experimental results demonstrate the
applicability of the proposed architecture and provide the infrastructure to quantify the
performance and overcome fault-handling limitations. Dynamic online autonomous functionality
restoration after a malfunction or functionality shift due to changing requirements is achieved at
a fine granularity by exploiting dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (PR) techniques.

A Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based hardware/software platform for intrinsic evolvable hardware is
designed and evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks.
Dynamic bitstream compilation for enhanced mutation and crossover operators is achieved by
directly manipulating the bitstream using a layered toolset. Experimental results on the edgedetector organic system prototype have shown complete organic online refurbishment after a
hard fault. In contrast to previous toolsets requiring many milliseconds or seconds, an average of
0.47 microseconds is required to perform the genetic mutation, 4.2 microseconds to perform the
single point conventional crossover, 3.1 microseconds to perform Partial Match Crossover
(PMX) as well as Order Crossover (OX), 2.8 microseconds to perform Cycle Crossover (CX),
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and 1.1 milliseconds for one input pattern intrinsic evaluation. These represent a performance
advantage of three orders of magnitude over the JBITS software framework and more than seven
orders of magnitude over the Xilinx design flow. Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) technique
was combined with the conventional GA in what is called CGT-pruned GA to reduce repair time
and increase system availability. Results have shown up to 37.6% convergence advantage using
the pruned technique.

Lastly, a quantitative stochastic sustainability model for reparable systems is formulated to
evaluate the Sustainability of FPGA-based reparable systems. This model computes at designtime the resources required for refurbishment to meet mission availability and lifetime
requirements in a given fault-susceptible missions. By applying this model to MCNC benchmark
circuits and the Sobel Edge-Detector in a realistic space mission use-case on Xilinx Virtex-4
FPGA, we demonstrate a comprehensive model encompassing the inter-relationships between
system sustainability and fault rates, utilized, and redundant hardware resources, repair policy
parameters and decaying reparability.
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CHAPTER 1: IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
PROBLEM

Attaining high availability, reliability and fault tolerance for digital systems have long been
recognized as a crucial non-functional requisite for mission critical applications. This
significance is further amplified in systems such as deep space and satellite systems. Those
systems target particularly sensitive missions and hence safety and security come first on top of
the priority list. Additionally, the cost, complexity, and restricted visibility associated with such
systems tend to be quite significant, consequently, longevity becomes a highly sought after
objective. This chapter introduces the problem at hand, sheds some light on the approaches
followed herein to tackle the problem and highlights the contributions of this work.

1.1. Need for Sustainable Systems
Deep space missions encounter a very harsh operating environment due to radiation, terrestrial
particles, temperature and pressure stresses, background noise, and immense electromagnetic
fields. Such a deployment environment is inevitably one of the most fault-prone environments
digital systems could be deployed into. Moreover, the limited possibilities to intervene at the
incident of a failure make a self-restoration capability after upsets an extremely imperative
characteristic to have, and the sustained spaceborne operation thus far, an increasingly
challenging problem to solve.
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Autonomous systems present an attractive space application as they aim to carry out complex
tasks in harsh and more importantly dynamic and uncertain environments. Their capacity of fault
tolerance and self-refurbishment grows in importance as the mission criticality and duration
increases and as the environment becomes out of control and expectancy.

SRAM-based FGPAs, like any semiconductor devices, are subject to hardware faults. These
faults could be soft faults which are transient or persistent Single Event Upsets (SEU) [1-7], or
hard permanent faults [8-14]. Details on FPGA faults are identified and discussed in the
following chapter. SEUs primarily affect storage elements and since FGPAs are built up from
memory cells, historically, SEUs have received significant attention. However, as technology
advances towards smaller nanoscale devices, systems exhibit appealing characteristics of high
densities, low power, smaller size and weight. Yet, technology advances introduce increased
undesirable fault susceptibility. In addition to manufacturing defects, nano-electronic devices are
expected to experience a high occurrence of runtime faults [15]. This trend deprecates traditional
fault tolerance approaches and promotes autonomous innovative ones.

FPGA repair mechanisms have been excessively explored. Repair techniques range from static
approaches involving simple spare replacement to highly sophisticated dynamic heuristics.
Despite the variety of these approaches, they all share a fundamental common goal of
functionality restoration among other characteristics such as latency, redundancy, complexity,
adaptability, coverage and sustainability.
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Regardless of the repair approach utilized, spare resources provide flexible capacity to replace
broken ones. Being dynamically reconfigurable at runtime, FGPAs enable the spare granularity
to miniaturize from modular redundancy to reconfigurable resource redundancy such as Lookup
Tables (LUT). The amount of unutilized (spare) reconfigurable resources the mission should
carry to sustain through the targeted period is a problem to resolve. This group of unutilized
resources is referred to herein by the Amorphous Resource Pool (ARP). A primary concern when
doing online refurbishment is the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). The lower the MTTR drops,
the higher the system availability becomes. Depending on the mission requirements, there is a
threshold of MTTR after which the mission falls below the acceptable availability level and
hence fails. As mission progresses, cumulative faults likelihood at best remains flat, but nearly
universally increases monotonically. It is anticipated that repair complexity becomes
increasingly challenging. Time-to-refurbish is anticipated to increase as more parts fail. One of
the main questions to answer becomes: What is the expected duration of a mission with
probability of success is greater than an acceptable threshold? More specifically, how can a
system sustain its functionality within planned mission availability and lifetime specifications
when operating in a failure-prone ecosystem?

A sustainable system is hereby defined as one that is sufficiently capable of achieving mission
objectives under specified ranges of varying conditions within a fault-susceptible deployment
environment. Unbounded survival under degrading conditions can not be possible and hence it is
fallacious to attempt assessing system‟s sustainability for realistic missions over an infinite time
interval. A more useful definition of a sustainable system hence becomes: a system capable to
operate without substantial functional depreciation throughout its expected lifetime enabled by a
14

particular likely finite regeneration strategy. In the electronic systems‟ context however, the
system is said to be sustainable if it is capable of handling imminent failures throughout its
lifetime by taking the actions necessary to maintaining the desired performance minimum
threshold.

1.2. Potential for Evolvable Hardware
Harsh operating environments, manufacturing defects, and component aging are contributing
causes of hardware faults that make sustained availability and performance requirements
difficult. Many hardware reliability approaches have been proposed in the literature such as fault
avoidance, design margin, modular redundancy, and fault refurbishment [16]. Fault avoidancebased design approaches aim to avoid possible faults that could occur at run time.

Such

approaches usually impose minimal size, weight, and power overheads. Meanwhile, design
margin approaches rely on an increased number of redundant system components and
capabilities to enhance reliability by designing with a margin for fault tolerance.

Despite the advantages of the above approaches, anticipating all the possible faults at designtime may not only be impractical, but also not adaptive to dynamic deployment environments
such as space. On the other hand, modular redundancy approaches utilize multiple identical
modules each of which is capable of delivering the desired functionality. These approaches
increase size, weight, and power consumption. Additionally, the recovery capacity of these
approaches is limited by the number and granularity of the available redundant modules.
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Fault refurbishment approaches, such as the proposed approach herein, offer a very competitive
option because of the high recovery capacity and adaptability to unforeseen conditions.
However, fault refurbishment is challenging due to the complexity involved in generating
configurations for implementing fault-free digital circuits on reconfigurable devices.

Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [17] are guided trial-and-error search techniques. They use the
principles of Darwinian evolution which target the survival of the fittest. This is essentially done
by casting a net over the entire solution space to find high fitness regions.

The

reprogrammability of FPGAs provides an efficient platform highly suitable for evolutionary fault
refurbishment platforms [18]. In the event of faults in FPGAs, a GA can be used to search and
implement alternate configurations that circumvent the faulty resource, thus providing device
refurbishment.

Evolutionary approaches such as Genetic Algorithms (GAs) appear throughout the literature as a
means to realize design and repair strategies on hardware-in-the-loop FPGA-based digital
systems [16-18]. GAs realize search strategies based on the Darwinian evolution principles by
performing genetic operations such as mutation and crossover. Several variations of GAs were
introduced to enhance the performance and speed of convergence to a solution for FPGA-based
systems [19]. However, many of these realizations employ software-in-the-loop simulations
rather than intrinsic implementations in the FPGA fabric. Challenges of realizing practical
intrinsic evolutionary strategies include the mapping of the genotype in the GA into its
corresponding phenotype on the fabric, and the limited control over process automation of
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altering and downloading safe bitstreams onto the device. These issues are exacerbated when the
critical portions of bitstream representation are proprietary.

Only a handful of intrinsic evolution platforms have been proposed throughout the literature.
However, these platforms are still inadequate since they either support a course granularity
evolution which yields a limited capability and flexibility, or they entail huge resource overhead
to work-around the reconfiguration limitations. This leads to a relatively high area and power
budgets which might not be tolerable in highly constrained applications such as space mission
systems.

An approach that provides a fast hardware/software interface between the GA and the FPGA
device via a straightforward data-structure and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) is
proposed, developed, tested, and analyzed in this dissertation. A layered design is used to
perform mapping operations at the finest granularity directly on the bitstream to modify LUT
configurations, and reprogram the device. This approach is tailored to be invoked from within
the system upon fault occurrence to achieve autonomous fault tolerance.

1.3. Self-x Properties: An Organic Computing Vision
Current high-performance processing systems are increasingly complex. They frequently consist
of heterogeneous processor subsystems that depend on one another in nontrivial ways, where
each subsystem is itself a multi-component system with diverse capabilities. The organization of
these subsystems is typically static, determined with great care at design time and optimized for a
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particular mode of operation. This design strategy is appropriate for systems that will be used in
relatively static circumstances and that will be accessible for repair when their components fail.
However, systems that will be used in dynamic situations, or those where human intervention to
reach for repairs once deployed is impractical, present a different set of challenges. In these
systems, the failure of a single component or a change in the desired mode of operation may
result in large-scale inefficiency or even complete system failure.

Electronic systems operating in dynamic environments, therefore, require an increased capability
for fault tolerance and self-adaptation, especially as their system complexities and
interdependencies continue to increase. The realization of systems that are capable of exhibiting
such adaptive behaviors constitutes the vision sought by Organic Computing (OC) by Schmeck
in [20]. The organic computing paradigm places high value on the so-called self-x properties,
which include self-configuration, self-reorganization, and self-healing [20-23]. These objectives
must be maintained in an autonomous fashion, yet sufficiently constrained to avoid undesirable
emergent behaviors.

Several distinct events may necessitate a change in the configuration of a multi-component
system. First, a fault may occur in an individual component, which must then be replaced,
repaired, or otherwise worked around. While we hypothesize that hardware failure would be the
most anticipated trigger for a configuration change, other possibilities, such as a storage device
reaching its capacity or the temperature of a chip becoming dangerously high, could be handled
similarly. Second, the performance level or functional requirements imposed on the system may
change, due to modified mission requirements or a change in the operational environment. In
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this case, the operation of the system components must be adapted to satisfy new requirements,
not simply restored to a previous operational state. In either case, existing components must be
reconfigured accordingly.

To decide on the appropriate actions to take in response to these events, the system must assess
its performance, comprehend its own current state, and enable mechanisms by which it can be
modified. The degree to which self-reorganization and self-configuration can succeed will be
limited by the degree to which the system is self-aware. A self-aware system would be capable
of matching available resources to mission priorities, maintaining self-awareness by continually
monitoring and evaluating its own state and the state of changing requirements, and using its
self-awareness to enable accurate and up-to-date reallocations of system resources to improve
performance.

Increasing the self-reliance of deployed systems would dramatically increase their dependability
and domains of applicability. For example, complex monitoring and recording devices able to
operate autonomously for long periods of time without external repair are essential for reducing
the risk involved in space missions, deep-sea missions, manned and unmanned avionic missions,
and deployments to remote or difficult terrestrial areas. A military or commercial satellite that
cannot recover from a hardware failure becomes orbiting space junk, or must be replaced at great
financial cost and societal impact. By contrast, a sustainable, self-aware satellite would offer
increased dependability and extended lifetime. Even partially self-aware solutions could have
enormous practical and economic impact, realized in terms of reduced maintenance costs, longer
operating life, and greater autonomy of deployed hardware systems. Thus became obvious the
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need for a practical design and implementation, which realizes an organic system platform that
exploits the current available technology to deliver all the awareness and flexibility sought
toward achieving sufficiently high reliability, dependability, and sustainability for critical
systems.

1.4. Contributions of Dissertation
The primary focus of this work is enhancing the fault tolerance capability and quantifying the
sustainability of digital electronic systems. This is achieved through an innovative holistic
architecture that enables organic self-awareness embedded within the different system hierarchylevels. By exploiting the dynamic runtime reconfigurablity of SRAM-base FPGA technology,
this approach encompasses an adaptive reconfigurable redundancy scheme augmented with
enhanced intrinsic evolutionary refurbishment platform. Listed below are the dissertation‟s main
contributions. Each innovation is discussed in details in the following chapters.

i.

Novel and comprehensive sustainable organic platform for SRAM FPGA-based missioncritical systems:

A two-layered architecture that integrates autonomous, organic, self-x capable hardware
elements at the chip level with a supervisory software to monitor, diagnose, and refactor
components at the subsystem and system levels is proposed, modeled, simulated, prototyped,
and analyzed. This platform offers system oversight and management at multiple levels
within the component hierarchy combining self-diagnostic capabilities of functional elements
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with supervision from autonomic supervisory layer. High-level capabilities circumvent most
severe impacts on mission performance, while self-repair capabilities of functional elements
autonomously correct localized immanent hardware failures.

ii.

Innovative reconfigurable adaptive redundancy scheme:

The proposed technique leverages the FPGA dynamic partial reconfiguration capability to
autonomously switch between various modes of operation depending on system health at
runtime. This technique optimizes chip area and power utilization over the state-of-the-art
and satisfies the fault tolerance needs. Moreover, it provides an outlier-based fault
identification tool which consistently achieves fault detection with one output-cycle latency
for articulated faults, and eliminates the need for additional test vectors.

The fact that the system runs most of the time in duplex mode results in substantial dynamic
power savings compared to the traditional widely-adopted TMR scheme. This also enhances
the chip capacity to temporally accommodate more functions within unutilized fabric area
while running in duplex mode. Moreover, the instantaneous switching from duplex to triplex
capability provides immediate full throughput recovery upon failure while the faulty design
is placed under refurbishment.

iii.

Intrinsic GA evolutionary refurbishment integrated framework:

A GA-based hardware/software framework for intrinsic evolvable hardware is designed and
evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks. Fast GA-
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based autonomous refurbishment is achieved by exploiting dynamic bitstream compilation
and partial reconfiguration through ultra-fast genetic operators in the micro-seconds range
along with intrinsic fitness assessment on the real PFGA fabric. Three enhanced sorting
genetic operators have been introduced to the digital circuit design for the first time.
Consensus based evolution results in a design-independent, model-free refurbishment
qualification through deterrence from dedicated pre-designed exhaustive testing cycles and
reliance on discrepancy-based evaluation with actual functional stimuli.

iv.

Expedited GA using CGT-pruned repair technique:

A novel technique that combines Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT)-based fault location
algorithms with the Genetic algorithms to expedite the evolution convergence time is developed
and analyzed. Knowledge regarding the location of hardware resource faults guides the GA
search process to converge into complete repair in fewer generations than when the knowledge is
unavailable. Experiments have shown that CGT-pruned genetic algorithm yields completely
refurbished FPGA configurations in 37.6% fewer generations on average than a conventional
GA.

v.

Quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based reparable systems:

A quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based reparable systems is formulated
and analyzed. This model estimates at design-time the resources required for refurbishment in
order to meet mission availability and lifetime requirements in a given ecosystem of different
fault types, rates, and impact. Hence, sustainability analysis provides analytical tools to refine
22

design appropriately within budget, area, power, and weight constraints. This model is applied to
circuits from the MCNC benchmark set with variations of parameters for illustration. Moreover,
the sustainability of a realistic space mission use-case is analyzed. The analysis is repeated to
demonstrate how mission‟s sustainability and useful lifetime can be extended by exploiting
FPGA resources available aboard when adopting the aforementioned developed Organic
refurbishment platform.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK

Throughout the literature, FPGA technology has been recognized as the best hardware platform
available with the sufficient reconfigurability and flexibility features needed in dynamically
evolving systems. Such systems are reconfigured either to achieve a refurbishment or to meet
changing requirements. Similarly, FPGAs are the best candidates for practical organic computing
implementations. Several fault tolerance paradigms have been explored and perhaps the most
efficient and less limited ones are the evolutionary ones such as the GA based approaches.

2.1. Evolution of Digital Circuit Design and Repair Tasks
Previous work on fault tolerance in FPGA-based systems varies from pre-defined design-time
approaches, to completely adaptive GA-based run-time repair approaches. For example, in the
pre-compiled column-based dual FPGA architecture approach [24], FPGA configurations created
at design-time are utilized for error detection and fault-circumvention.

These precompiled

configurations have the same functional design but utilize different set of reconfigurable columns
on the chip through different placement and routing constraints. Loading these configurations
successively emulates shifting configurations‟ columns. The process continues until the column
with the culprit resource is not used by the loaded configuration anymore. In this approach fault
isolation is achieved by using distributed Concurrent Error Detection (CED) checkers while
performing the blind reconfiguration. However, the repair process is not evolutionary and is
limited by the number of available precompiled configurations. Also the solutions obtained
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might lead to a high subset of resources being excluded from the operational resources as the
granularity of the solutions is at the column level which is considered substantially high.
Moreover, this approach scales quite poorly with multiple faults.

A traditional widely adopted fault tolerance technique is the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
[25]. In [16], fault tolerance is accomplished through TMR by utilizing a voting system that
votes amongst three functionally-identical modules. Upon fault detection, the faulty module
undergoes offline evolutionary repair without the need to perform fault isolation.

Other

evolutionary approaches to fault tolerance include [26] and [27], however, it is only in [28] and
[29] that resource performance information is obtained, maintained and then used as feedback in
the repair process. However, in [28] it is the configuration performance information that is
maintained rather than the performance of the resources themselves.

In [29] performance

information at the resource level is maintained, however, this approach has issues such as high
fault detection latency, performance degradation in the absence of fault, and increased
operational complexity.

In [30], the authors present results from the adaptation of various CGT algorithms for fault
isolation in FPGAs. Runtime fault detection without using special test vectors is achieved by
repeatedly comparing the outputs of configurations for discrepancies as described in [31]. The
presence of a faulty output ascertained using bit-wise output comparison with an ideal output
provides information regarding the fitness of individual resources used by the configuration.
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There are two paradigms for implementing GAs in reconfigurable applications: Extrinsic
Evolution via functional models that abstract the physical aspects of the real device, and Intrinsic
Evolution on the actual devices. Extrinsic approaches simplify the evolution process as they
operate on software models of the FPGAs. However for applications like in-situ fault handling
on deep space missions, not all fault types can be readily accommodated within software models.
Additionally, abstracting the physical aspects of the target device complicates rendering the final
designs into actual on-board circuits, for instance, limitations such as routability of the design
cannot be ensured until the final stages of the configuration process. Furthermore, fitness
evaluation on hardware usually requires less time than software simulations, and that makes
intrinsic evolution mostly considered for its higher performance and scalability as an efficient
approach to realizing physical designs in critical systems.

Several previous research efforts have addressed intrinsic evolution. A successful attempt on
Field Programmable Transistor Array (FPTA) chips was carried out by [18]. The authors
proposed new ideas for long-term hardware reliability using evolvable hardware techniques via
an evolutionary design tool named EHWPack that facilitates intrinsic evolution by incorporating
the PGAPack genetic engine with Labview test-bed running on UNIX workstation. They were
able to intrinsically evolve a Digital XNOR Gate on two connected FPTA boards. In this
dissertation, we target FPGAs rather than FPTAs and specifically the popular Xilinx Virtex
family device.

Miller, Thomson, and Fogarty [17] previously addressed the importance of direct evolution on
the Xilinx 6216 FPGA devices; the research explored the effect of the device physical constraints
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on evolving digital circuits. A mapping between the representation genotype and the device
phenotype was proposed, however, no implementation details were presented. Hollingworth,
Smith, and Tyrrell developed intrinsic evolution platform for a 2-bit adder on a Xilinx FPGA
with partial reconfiguration to improve evolution time [32]. However, they used the JBits
interface for run-time reconfiguration.

JBits is Java-based, and being interpreted can face

scalability and performance issues and is no longer supported.

Another way to achieve online reconfigurability is proposed by Upegui, Peña-Reyes, and
Sanchez in [33]. In this approach, the system is divided into sub-modules, and several different
partial reconfiguration bitstreams are generated in advance for each module using Xilinx Module
Based Partial Reconfiguration flow. GA combines partial bitstreams that best perform the
required task optimally or sub-optimally. This simulated approach is constrained by the limited
number of possible combinations generated beforehand. Furthermore, its course granularity
makes it only suitable for certain applications where the system can be divided into well-defined
modules with fixed interfaces such as the neural network use case discussed by the authors.

A promising technique called the Virtual Reconfigurable Circuit (VRC) method was proposed by
Sekanina in [34] and [35] and also in a similar work by Glette and Torresen [36]. This method
does not change the bitstream of the FPGA itself, but rather changes the register values of a
reconfigurable circuit already implemented on the FPGA, and obtains virtual reconfigurability.
Although this method provides online reconfigurability, it incurs a very high area and power
overhead and could increase the number of elements that can break from a fault tolerance point
of view. Moreover, these schemes implement phenotype abstraction by predefining several
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functions that can be performed by a computational cell. Although, this abstraction has shown
benefit in convergence time in some cases [10], it incurs mapping overhead and adds constraints
to the flexibility which limits the search space and does not fully exploit the hardware capability.

In several previous works [4, 37, 38], methodologies are proposed to enable runtime FPGA
reconfiguration while keeping the Xilinx CAD tools out of the loop to achieve smaller
reconfiguration delays. Such approaches can be used as platforms to achieving tractable intrinsic
evolution.

In a previous work within our research group, a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration
Architecture (MRRA) was developed for Autonomous Runtime Partial Reconfiguration of
FPGA devices [39]. The tool comprises three layers, namely Logic, Translation, and
Reconfiguration layers, with well-defined interfaces for modularity and reuse. In addition, a
standard set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) was utilized for communication with
the target device. Results had shown the ability of the framework to support autonomous and
dynamic reconfiguration operations. We have extended the MRRA platform to support two
basic genetic operators [40] which is further extended herein to support five enhanced genetic
operators namely: Single point conventional crossover, Partial Match Crossover (PMX) [41],
Order Crossover (OX) [41, 42], Cycle Crossover (CX) [42, 43], and Genetic Mutation directly to
realize intrinsic evolution on Xilinx Virtex-4 devices. All five genetic operators are evaluated
experimentally and results are compared for their ability to achieve fault repair in a number of
fault handling scenarios. This intrinsic evolution platform is used as part of the proposed solution
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to achieve evolutionary refurbishment of the faulty configurations reported by the organic layer
as will be discussed later in Chapter 3.

2.2. Organic Computing Concepts
The field of organic computing is beginning to demonstrate promising results at the level of
single chips. A widely known generic OC platform called the Autonomous System-on-a-Chip
(ASoC) architecture, proposed in [22], is depicted in Figure 1. The ASoC platform consists of
two layers: the Functional Layer and the Autonomic Layer. The ASoC Autonomic Layer
contains Autonomic Elements (AEs) that are responsible for correct operation of the
corresponding Functional Elements (FEs) present on the Functional Layer. Each FE (e.g., CPU,
RAM, and Network Interface) has a counterpart Monitor / Evaluator / Actuator component
within the Autonomic Layer.

Within the ASoC architecture, the Autonomic Layer also contains an Autonomic Supervisor
(AS), which has no counterpart on the Functional Layer.

The autonomic supervisor is

responsible for maintaining the correct functionality of all the elements on the Autonomic Layer.
The manner in which it operates is not specified by the ASoC architecture. Thus, the current
proposal is largely concerned with defining the AS role and capabilities of the autonomic
supervisor in more detail as comprehensive Cognitive Layer.

OC systems adhering to the ASoC architecture rely on self-organization to respond to internal
imbalances and changing environmental conditions [21, 44, 45]. Reconfigurable logic devices
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such as FPGAs are known to offer an attractive hardware platform for these systems, and provide
the organic architecture with sufficient capability for exhibiting self-adaptive behavior [20-23].
Specifically, SRAM-based FPGA devices can realize self-adaptation within their reconfigurable
logic fabric [28, 46, 47]. These approaches are capable of detecting certain types of internal
errors as well as initiating reconfiguration when necessary within a single FPGA [40].

Beyond self-monitoring and self-repairing at the level of a single chip, we seek to confer these
properties to the larger mission-level systems which utilize them. In order to incorporate the
System-on-a-Chip autonomy into an organic-computing subsystem, system, or system-ofsystems, it is necessary to monitor the functionality of the AEs within each chip, and to manage
the impact of reduced chip functionality due to either permanent or transient faults while repairs
are ongoing. Within the single-chip architecture, no provisions are attempted for maintaining the
correctness of the AS‟s behavior. Finally, the self-repair process within an individual chip may
be intractable due to larger than local permanent damages, so a strategy is needed for handling
the impact of chip-level failures.

Within a complex system composed of many components, self-repair can take place at multiple
levels. First, individual components may be able to repair themselves without changing their
roles within the overall system.

Second, the system may be able to restore its overall

functionality by assigning new roles to different components.
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Figure 1. Autonomous-System-on-a-Chip architecture [22].

The system may also be able to optimize its overall operational performance by applying both
approaches concurrently. These approached can be applied within the Organic Layer.

Recent efforts in organic computing, as already discussed, address primarily the first type of
recovery, in which components repair themselves in an application-independent fashion. This
application-independent repair is quite appropriate for the lowest-level components of the system
that perform primitive functions.

The primary goal towards attaining sustainability at the

component-level is refurbishment of individual components to their original functionality. When
this is tractable, a single-chip repair is sufficient to recover functionality and maintain
performance.
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These circumstances do not apply to composites of subsystems, let alone for an entire system
like a satellite containing over 100 FPGA devices dedicated to tasks ranging from signal
processing to encryption. At the system level, repair strategies may be more diverse and become
more closely coupled with mission requirements.

Acceptable behavior may be defined by an

envelope of metric values rather than a single function, and different types of suboptimal
performance can be assigned different valuations depending on mission requirements.
Approaches to guaranteeing correct functionality of the mission are complexly correlated with
the performance of individual elements.

These complexities can be addressed within the

Cognitive Layer in our proposed architecture discussed in the following chapter.

In the Cognitive Layer, an application-dependent knowledge-based approach can be utilized to
perform fault detection, system repair, and resource reallocation activities reliably and in a
reasonable amount of time. Simultaneously, at the resource level, components ranging from
sensors and actuators to processors and memory elements must individually operate within their
specified tolerances to maintain acceptable performance levels.
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2.3. Sustainability Analysis
The term sustainability is repeatedly used in ecology, economics, sociology, and environmental
sciences and their interactions [48-50]. It refers to the equilibrium state of consumption versus
regeneration within some open or closed system. The term Sustainability, has been applied to
computer applications on a limited scale. For example, in [51], Seacord, et al. developed a
sustainability model for computer software planning and management which enables the balance
between the sustainment team and the customer modification requests. In [52], Watari, et al.
proposed a solution to increase the sustainability of computer networks which defines the
sustainability as the balance between failure events and the autonomous dynamic reconfiguration
to retain connectivity. In [53], Mocigemba explains the transfer of the term Sustainability into the
IT world as being the balance between economic, social and ecological interests. The term can
be further studied and refined [54]. This dissertation formulates the sustainability concept into
the digital electronics domain and specifically with pertinent use cases of autonomous designs
deployed into error-prone unpredictable environments. In this context, Sustainability refers to the
equilibrium state of failure and repair events the system undergoes while retaining functionality
over mission lifetime. To the best of our knowledge, sustainability is yet to be addressed from
the proposed perspective.
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2.3.1. Need for Sustainability Analysis
Sustainability analysis in this context might be analogous to what is referred to in the literature
by reparable systems mission reliability. Mission system reliability of reparable and nonreparable systems has been addressed in plethora of published articles in the literature. In
general, the approaches can be divided into two main categories: topological or combinatorial
modeling and state-space modeling.

In the combinatorial modeling, the system is mapped into a fixed structure or network. Such
approaches primarily use fault trees and reliability block diagrams. Fault tree is the logical
mapping of system‟s physical design. It depicts the relations between certain causes and basic
events that lead to major failure events so called “Top events” [55-57]. There are two main
approaches to calculate system reliability from fault trees: qualitative based on the min-cut
analysis as electrical circuits have s-coherent fault trees [58, 59] and quantitative based on
probabilistic evaluation [60]. In the qualitative techniques, Boolean equations are formulated for
top-level failure events. Then Boolean algebra is used to calculate the exact time of failures.
Alternatively, simulations can be used. On the other hand, the quantitative approaches, build the
s-coherent fault tree for the design by calculating the probability of basic events based on
component‟s failure probability density function (pdf). And then a probabilistic evaluation can
be constructed for top-level events by evaluating the min-cuts of the fault tree. To reduce the
complexity, the min-cuts can be approximated by calculating the upper and lower bound
probabilities for top-level events.
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In summary, combinatorial modeling techniques have high computational complexity that could
become intractable for large systems. Furthermore, its complexity scales up exponentially with
design size despite the proposed enhancements such as reduced-edges and importance sampling
[61]. Additionally, these techniques are only suitable for static designs and can only address
failure modes known at design time. Therefore, this class of approaches falls short with
reconfigurable systems deployed in dynamic environments.

On the other hand, in the state-space modeling techniques [34, 35, 38, 62], all system states get
defined based on component possible states. A component has two states: functional, or
degraded. For non-reparable systems, the probability of a component going from degraded state
to functional state is zero. In reparable systems a component can go back and forth between these
two states with certain failure and repair probabilities. After that time, a probabilistic modeling
for component state transition is formulated and accordingly a probabilistic system state
transition is formulated to find the probabilities of the top-level failure events. These mainly
employ Markov chains and Petri-nets.

This class of approaches works well for simple systems with few components or for large
systems but at a coarse granularity as subsystem-level, i.e. failures and repairs are considered as
per subsystem and no consideration is made to intra-subsystem events at the component-level.
Otherwise, it may end up with a very large state space that may require lumping to become
tractable such as mergeable Markov states and non-effective edge elimination [33], or splitting
and simulation such as Markov Chain Monte-Carlo MCMC [63].
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Although the aforementioned techniques from both categories tackle the problem of system
reliability calculation differently, they can be all computationally intensive, fairly complex to
formulate and exhibit NP-hard time complexity to resolve when applied at component
granularity. Moreover, they are poorly scalable and best fit for either small systems with very
limited number of components or being applied at a coarse granularity in which failures are
considered at sub-system level. Real-life applications include FPGA designs with hundreds or
thousands of reconfigurable resources that can span multiple chips. For example, NASA
THEMIS mission has a reconfigurable payload called ARTEMIS of 3 Xilinx V4LX160 FPGA
devices to perform configurable band-pass processing and Fast Fourier Transformations (FFT)
on instrument data [64]. This represents an example of a mission critical application deployed in
a very harsh environment with high number or reconfigurable resources that can be intractable to
analyze using the aforementioned techniques.

The presented work aims at practically estimating the sustainability of FGPA-based reparable
systems. It benefits from the particular FGPA‟s trait being built up from highly interconnected
identical resources: Lookup Tables (LUT), Input/Output Blocks (IOB), nets, flip-flops, and
MUXs”. These resources have identical and statistically independent probabilistic failure
distributions.

The majority of FPGA reliability calculation and enhancement related work targeted
manufacturing defects or soft faults [65]. Being built from SRAM cells, FPGAs are subject to
many runtime failures due to environmental and structural reasons. There are several approaches
in the literature to enhance the reliability of the FPGA-based systems [66]. Few have addressed
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the runtime reliability of FPGA-based systems in realistic mission use cases, and much less are
those which have explored the reparable fault tolerant system‟s varying reliability throughout the
mission lifetime. In this dissertation we introduce a concept called the sustainability of reparable
fault tolerant FGPA-based systems. It provides a practical topology-agnostic stochastic method
for evaluating the repair technique and the resource allocation to attain certain level of system
availability for targeted mission duration.

2.3.2. SRAM-based Fault Modeling
FGPAs are subject to two main categories of faults: Soft and Hard faults as shown in Table 1.
Soft faults are mainly Single Event Upsets (SEU) caused when a high-energy particle such as
proton, neutron, alpha, or heavy ion strikes a storage element e.g. LUT, IOB, Flip-Flop, etc. This
fault is manifested by a logical value inversion of that element. When the SEU occurs in the
datapath flops or memories, it is transient in the sense that it only affects the data being
processed at the time of the SEU and usually disappears after that. On the other hand, if the SEU
impacts a configuration memory element, it causes the design to malfunction and hence called
Firm Soft Faults. Firm soft errors can be readily recovered by reprogramming the device with the
original configuration known as scrubbing [67]. Firm soft faults in the reconfiguration circuitry
could disrupt any further scrubbing attempts and hence require total system re-initialization
which may not be possible during mission. We call such faults Persistent Soft Faults. These
faults are treated as permanent hard faults from reliability point of view [7].
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Hard faults, on the other hand, entail permanent physical damage to the device substrate. There
are three main causes of hard faults: manufacturing defects due to process imperfections known
as the Infant Mortality defects, Total Ionization Dose (TID) radiation-induced and aging-induced
faults [68]. Aging induced faults include: Electromigration (EM), Time-Dependent Dielectric
Breakdown (TDDB), Hot Carrier Effect/Injection (HCE/HCI), and Negative Bias Thermal
Instability (NBTI). EM is the phenomenon of electron depletion in very thin wires with increased
temperature. This creates a highly resistive path which entails high net delays that causes the
system to fail to meet timing or can result in open circuit “stuck at open” [11, 12]. TDDB is the
incident when electrons are trapped in the imperfections of the oxide well enough to create a
very low resistive path “short circuit” at the transistor gate terminal which results in flipping
transistor state and sluggish transistor switching characteristics. TDDB rate increases at high
temperatures and thin oxide layers [8-10]. HCI describes the phenomenon in which carriers gain
sufficient energy to be injected into the gate oxide. The damage results in degradation in the
transistor switching frequency, which can affect design frequency limit as well as functional
malfunction as the path seizes to meet timing [11, 13]. NBTI occurs when holes in the
PMOSFET inverted channel interact with Si compounds to produce donor type interface states
and possibly positive fixed charge [11, 14].
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Table 1. SRAM-Based FPGA Fault Characteristics

Cat.
Soft

Type
SET

Source
Radiation

Firm

Radiation

PCSE

Radiation

Hard Manufacture Infant
Mortality
Radiation
TID
TDDB

Aging

EM

Aging

HCI

Aging

NBTI

Aging

Cause
Description
Soft Error Transient. Cause: SEU (highenergy particle “proton, neutrons, alpha,
heavy ion” striking a storage element)
Cause: SEU

Affected
Resources
Design flops
and memory
Configuration
Memory*

SemiPermanent

Scrubbing

Power Cycle Soft Error [69].
Cause: SEU
Process Imperfections

Reconfiguration
Circuitry
All

Persistent
Permanent

Power-onreset
Mask out

Change switching char.

LUT, IOBs,
MUXs, FF
LUT, IOBs,
MUXs, FF

Permanent

Avoid

Permanent

Avoid

Interconnect

Permanent

Avoid

LUT, IOBs,
Mem
LUT, IOBs,
BRAM

Permanent

Avoid on
Critical Path
Avoid on
Critical Path

Electrons trapped in imperfections of the
oxide well enough to create very low resistive
path “short circuit” at the transistor gate
Electron depletion in very thin wires with
increased temp. creates a highly resistive path
Traps at oxide surface, change of VTh of
transistors
Temperature distribution, PAR dependent

* 95% of memory elements including BRAM is configuration memory.
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Volatility
Transient

Permanent

Refurbishment
Not needed

In this work, Soft faults will not be considered in our analysis due to their transient nature and
straightforward resolution. Likewise, Infant Mortality faults will be disregarded too since they
can be identified through exhaustive testing in design qualification and bring-up process.
Radiation induced hard faults will also be ignored due to the assurance from the FPGA
manufacturers through their published reliability reports [3]. For example, in [70] Alfke et al.
indicate that XQR4000XL radiation-hardened device family exhibits latch-up immunity at
LET>100 MeVcm2/mg at 125°C.

Therefore, the analysis herein will consider aging induced faults only. These faults exist and
need to be address [67, 71]. This requires refurbishment techniques that involve reconfiguring
the device to avoid using the broken components. Hard faults may occur during the operational
phase flat region of the bath tub shown in Figure 2. However, since the use cases of interest in
this research exceed the useful life we concentrate on the wear out period in the following
analysis. For instance, a 90-nm SRAM-based FPGA device indicates 3-year useful life under
125°C [72] while the use case discussed in Chapter 6 has a 8-year lifetime requirement under
stressful conditions. Furthermore, runtime hard faults are anticipated to become more frequent as
CMOS-based devices are shrinking in size and hence reliability has become the most critical
challenge facing future nanoelectronics [15].
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Figure 2. The Bathtub Curve [73]
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CHAPTER 3: MULTI-LAYER HIGH-LONGEVITY ARCHITECTURE

In order to address the limitations of existing approaches, as discussed in the previous chapter, a
two-layered architecture that integrates autonomous, organic, self-x capable hardware elements
at the chip level with supervisory software to monitor, diagnose, and refactor components at the
subsystem and system levels is proposed, developed, and evaluated. This approach makes use of
the self-monitoring and self-healing properties of the individual chips, while providing an
additional cognition capability for higher-level fault detection, mission-specific optimization,
and adaptation to changing mission priorities.

3.1. System Architecture
This novel architecture consists of a hardware-based organic layer and a software-based
cognitive layer. Components at the organic layer are organized into overlapping functional
groups, each of which bears responsibility for a particular set of mission-relevant tasks. Within
the cognitive layer, monitoring and diagnostic processes continually track the behavior of these
functional groups and determine whether their behavior characteristics fall within expected
profiles.

As shown in Figure 3, the Cognitive Layer consists of four components: Process Model,
Operation Manager (OM), Performance Monitor (PM), and Autonomic Supervisor (AS).

The

Organic Layer, on the other hand, consists of organic units each has one Autonomic Element
(AE) and three Functional Elements (FEs) reside on the FPGA fabric. Starting in the lower left
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corner of FPGA 1, two FEs process the inputs in duplicate using a Concurrent Error Detection
arrangement while the third FE is a cold standby to conserve power over a Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) [25] configuration.

The functional outputs of the duplicate FEs are

monitored by the AE on FPGA 1 for autonomous fault detection, isolation, resolution, and
possibly self-repair using the intrinsic evolutionary repair platform discussed in the proceeding
section.

Figure 3. Soar-Longevity Conceptual Architecture

Simultaneously, the same FE outputs are sent as Observations to the PM in the Cognitive Layer.
The PM normalizes the FEs performance information on an absolute scale ranging from 0 to 1,
and passes the normalized value to the OM. The OM detects any discrepancy between the
requirements dictated by process model and the observed performance. When their difference
exceeds tolerances, the OM reacts accordingly.

43

Thus, the Cognitive Layer interacts with the Organic Layer by:



Managing multiple organic units on multiple FPGAs, each containing one AE, two active
FEs and one dormant FE



Receiving status reports from AEs via the Cognitive Layer Stub (CLS).



Determining whether output conforms to expected profiles via the PM



When tolerances are exceeded or mission priorities change, reasoning over knowledge in
the Process Model about what to do next:

o Wait for affected FPGAs to self-repair?

o Reroute traffic to a redundant FPGA?

o Redistribute work load across viable components?

Finally, key components of the Cognitive Layer can be implemented as an organic FPGA device
to provide it with certain self-x properties.

Realization of the Soar-Longevity architecture would enhance the ability of organic computing
systems to monitor system capability during execution, by incorporating a cognitive
understanding of how the performance of individual components can combine to generate overall
system performance. It would also improve organic computing systems‟ ability to manage and
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configure system resources, by allowing system-level reorganization in response to componentlevel hardware failures. This approach combines a number of innovative aspects within an
overall solution. Some of the novel features of the developed architecture are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2. Innovative aspects of the Soar-Longevity approach.

Feature
System oversight and management at
multiple levels within the component
hierarchy

Uniform AE design
Outlier-based Fault Identification
Model-free Refurbishment Qualification

Intrinsic Evolutionary self-heal

Innovation
Combining self-diagnostic capabilities of functional elements with
oversight from autonomic supervisor; high-level capabilities circumvent
most severe impacts on mission performance, while self-repair
capabilities of functional elements autonomously correct localized
failures
Pre-determined design for Autonomic Elements (AEs) despite the fact
that they monitor different types of Functional Elements (FEs)
Elimination of additional test vectors while detecting first discrepant
output.
Deterrence from dedicated pre-designed exhaustive testing cycles for
refurbished design qualification and reliance on discrepancy-based
evaluation with actual functional stimuli.
Fast GA-based autonomous refurbishment with intrinsic fitness
assessment on the real PFGA fabric

Another important aspect is the orientation of the Cognitive Layer on the board outside of the
critical path of execution. Consequently, while a blocking failure will remove the ability of the
Cognitive Layer to provide part of the self-x capabilities to the system, the system‟s primary
functionality and hardware-realized organic properties are not affected.

Typically, the Organic Layer should resolve any upset upon failure by itself and regain full
functionality. This self-repair is performed by reconfiguring the component using pre-generated
configuration bitstreams that provide comparable performance to the initially loaded
configuration, or through evolutionary repair supported by the intrinsic evolution platform
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proposed herein. However, depending on the scope and severity of the fault, this option may not
be available. Consider the case where the board‟s image filtering FPGA has a logical stuck-atzero fault on the input of one of its look-up tables. The chip has detected a local failure, and has
already informed the Cognitive Layer of the fault, and attempted to circumvent that failure.
However, by examining the chip‟s performance after refurbishment and comparing it against its
process model, it turns out that the new configuration is only allowing the chip to achieve 15dB
SNR, which is less than the 20dB specified in the mission requirements. Here, the cognitive
layer uses its knowledge of the board-level capabilities and any flexibility defined within the
mission requirements to determine and implement a course of action.

The Cognitive Layer needs to know the level of impairment and the repair status of each
autonomous element.

Some of this information can be derived by observing functioning

autonomous elements and comparing their behavior characteristics to acceptable ranges.
However, since the autonomous elements gather extremely detailed data as to their functioning
and use this data to produce quantitative measures of their fitness, they themselves are the best
source of information as to their current capabilities. In the other direction, the autonomous
elements need to be informed of reorganization requests.

The autonomous functional elements have the ability of self-monitoring through Concurrent
Error Detection (CED) with Stand-by (SB) [74]. To invoke its self-healing mode, it must be able
on its own to detect errors during run-time [75-77]. Reconfiguration and detection techniques
explored include scrubbing, which is the continuous reconfiguration of the bitstream to refresh
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the stored configuration [78], Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) techniques [79] on-chip hardware test
benches [80], and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [25, 74].

The information regarding the current state of the autonomous elements present within the
Organic Layer is conveyed upward to the Cognitive Layer through an interface, as shown in
Figure 2. To the extent that quantitative information can be made available to the Cognitive
Layer, it can be used to weigh the utility of reconfiguring components against the cost of waiting
for a temporarily impaired component to finish refurbishing itself. In order for this information
to be transferred between the Cognitive Layer and the Organic Layer, we have designed and
developed an interlayer data exchange protocol described in the following sections.

Mission priorities will be higher for some types of tasks than for others, or for some performance
metrics applied to individual tasks. This will influence the allocation of resources in various
ways. For instance, autonomous elements are only partially available during self-repair, so
partially impaired elements may be temporarily taken off-line or reassigned by the Cognitive
Layer, depending on their mission criticality. Similarly, self-repair may not completely succeed,
and repaired elements may be considered less reliable than pristine elements. This will also
affect the allocation of resources. The overall goal is that the system becomes self-aware at the
chip level as well as the system level and thus able to respond appropriately to problems arising
at all levels.

Cognitive Layer design is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The focus hereafter will be
primarily on the Organic Layer design, implementation, and evaluation.

47

3.2. Organic Layer Design and Implementation
It is implied from the discussion in the previous chapters that the Organic Layer should be
designed and implemented in a structured manner that not only would allow the layer to exhibit
its self-x properties such as the self-reporting, self-diagnosis, and self-repair, but also should be
able to perform all these tasks in a timely manner that copes with the criticality of the target
application. Furthermore, the Organic Layer should carry out the communication with the
Cognitive Layer concurrently while monitoring its elements and delivering the required
functional output.

3.2.1. Organic Layer Architecture
The Organic Layer is exclusively implemented on hardware. However, it is accompanied with
three software components which provide the interface with the Cognitive Layer. The Organic
Layer consists of one or more Organic Units (OU) and Dispatchers configured on one or
multiple FPGA chips as shown in Figure 4. The OU is the smallest integrated unit in the organic
layer. It consists of one AE and three FEs. Initially, it is configured to be in duplex mode in
which only two FEs are online and the third is a cold-spare standby. If a fault is detected, the AE
switches to TMR mode (i.e. puts the cold-spare FE online and implements a voting scheme). An
FPGA can accommodate one or more organic unites based on the unit complexity and the FPGA
resources. The Dispatcher on the other hand is responsible for directing the full duplex
communication flow from the JTAG port to the destination AE in the selected OU and vice
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versa. One Dispatcher is needed per FPGA chip to handle all the communication routing
amongst the OUs implemented on that chip.

Figure 4. Organic Layer Architecture

The first Organic Layer – Cognitive Layer interfacing component is the Autonomic Element Stub
(AES), responsible for polling the messages from the AEs through a physical link (JTAG
connection) and delivering them to the Cognitive Layer through sockets. The second component
is the Functional Element Stub (FES), responsible for polling the messages concerning the FEs
performance through a physical link (JTAG connection) and delivering them to the Performance
Monitor (PM) module in the cognitive layer through software sockets.
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Figure 5. AES and FES Class Diagram

50

The last software component is the Reconfiguration Manager (RM), which is responsible for
performing reconfiguration requests as well as running refurbishment algorithms (e.g. Genetic
Algorithm). Figure 5 shows the class diagram design for the AES and the FES. A concise
description of each of the classes shown in the class diagram is listed in Table 3.

Table 3. AES and FES Class Description

Class
Connection

Description
Responsible for managing the physical communication with
the external modules. It supports two implementations (USB,
Socket).
CommunicationController Manages one or many connections (e.g. multiple USB
connections to different AEs). Instantiated and used by the
module managers.
Message
Simple class that carries message information.
Timer
Responsible for firing cyclic events to module managers to
support periodic processes (e.g. polling messages, manage
Inbox, etc…)
Dispatcher
Added to implement asynchronous communication between
module managers
AEManager
Holds detailed view of the organic layer (could be read from a
configuration file that contains the organic layer structure such
as available AEs/FEs and their addresses) and manages
sending and receiving messages to/from AEs.
ASManager
Responsible for sending and receiving messages to/from AS.
RMManager
Controls initiating refurbishment and reporting results.
FEManager
Holds details of the FEs in the organic layer and manages
receiving functional output from the FEs.
PMManager
Responsible for sending messages to the PM in the CL.
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Figure 6 shows the architectural details of the OL Dispatcher module.
PC

FES
AES

RM
LPT
Xilinx Parallel Cable IV

SW Socket

JTAG

FPGA Chip
OL
Dispatcher

GNAT

...

Outbox FIFO

...

To AEs

32-bit

16-Entries

16-Entries

Inbox FIFO

32-bit

From AEs

Figure 6. Organic Layer Dispatcher Architecture

The idea of grouping the AE and its associated three FEs within the logical concept of the
Organic Unit rather than assigning one AE per FPGA chip makes possible to have several
Organic Units coexisting in the same chip. This increases the flexibility of the system to
efficiently accommodate several heterogeneous organic functional elements simultaneously on
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the same chip, or even to divide one large functional element into multiple organic small
functional elements within their corresponding Organic Units to increase fault tolerance at a finer
granularity.

In each Organic Unit, initially, only two FEs are operational while the third is kept offline as a
cold spare. This configuration mode is called the Duplex mode of operation. It is possible to
instantly detect any functional fault under the duplex mode by simply monitoring the outputs of
the two identical FEs. Upon discrepancy between the two outputs, which indicates fault
occurrence, the AE switches to Triplex mode of operation by putting the standby third FE online
and enabling a voting scheme amongst the three FE‟s to elicit the correct output and identify the
faulty FE. The identified faulty FE is placed under in situ refurbishment immediately by the
means the intrinsic Genetic Algorithm. This autonomous localized organic behavior inherent
within the OU is referred to hereafter by Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy Scheme (RARS).
While the duplex mode has a shortcoming of wasting one clock cycle upon fault occurrence till
the correct functional output is regained, it saves 33% of the dynamic power over the industry
standard TMR arrangement in the no fault running situation. Power savings are quantified for a
realistic space mission use-case in Chapter 6. Moreover, the fact that the standby FE is normally
offline makes its resources available for use by other functional elements.

The proposed architecture for the Organic Unit is shown in Figure 7. The functional input is
delivered directly to the three FEs for evaluation. The outputs of the FEs are then sent to the AE
to be processed by three modules: the Discrepancy Detector, Voter, and the Output Actuator.
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Figure 7. Organic Unit Architecture

The Discrepancy Detector detects the occurrence of a discrepancy between the two online AEs.
This module is only active when the Organic Unit is running in the duplex mode and is disabled
otherwise to save power. From its name, the Voter module performs the bitwise voting between
the three FEs outputs and produces the majority vote output. It also generates a report that
indicates which of the three FEs is the faulty one in the case of a single faulty FE or indicates
that the three FEs are discrepant in the case of multiple faulty FEs. Because the Voter is
performing bitwise voting, the probability of getting a correct majority vote is still very high
even in the cases when multiple FEs are faulty since it is unlikely that two FEs will articulate
their faults similarly. The Voter is enabled only in the triplex mode and is disabled otherwise
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again to save power. The Output Actuator is controlled by the Autonomic Controller to pass
through one of its four inputs and possibly mask output portions according to the Voter report.

On the other hand, the Autonomic Controller is the Finite State Machine (FSM) that orchestrates
the AE different modules interactions. It is responsible for all the awareness needed about the
FEs health status, performance, current state of the unit, and the organic decision making.
Furthermore, it is responsible for conducting status reports and receiving control signals from/to
the Cognitive Layer. In order for such communication to take place gracefully and be able to
handle the one-to-many (Cognitive Layer to multiple OUs) two way communication, a messagebased full duplex protocol is developed that satisfies the currently proposed features and yet
expandable to incorporate new messages to support additional features. This protocol can
become the basis for a standard inter-layer communication protocol in multi-layer organic
systems. The design for sixteen protocol messages is listed in APPENDEX B.

Within the autonomic computing context, golden elements which represent a single point of
failure are not tolerable. However, eliminating them given the numerous probable fault scenarios
is not possible. The existence of single points of failure in the system reduces its reliability and
could jeopardize its chances to demonstrate its organic properties. Although golden elements
cannot be eliminated from a given design, their effect can be minimized by minimizing their
articulation probability. Such state can be achieved by creating a cross-monitoring capability
among the system‟s golden elements.
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In the organic systems generally, and in the organic architecture proposed herein specifically, the
Autonomic Element is a golden element of which functionality cannot be restored upon failure.
Therefore, and in order to build a highly sustainable organic system, the autonomically
sustainable architecture described in this dissertation enables the cognitive layer to catch
potential problems within the AEs and reconfigure with alternative bitstreams to work-around
the issue.

3.2.2. Intrinsic Evolutionary Repair Platform
We have developed an intrinsic evolutionary repair platform in [40]. This platform is further
tailored to run in partial reconfiguration mode and is integrated with the proposed organic
system. This platform is triggered either externally by the Cognitive Layer or internally from
within the Organic Layer itself to perform evolutionary repair. The developed platform consists
of MRRA components that reside on the FPGA chip, and software components on the host PC,
however, they are developed into layered modules that can be readily migrated to an on-chip
general purpose microprocessor such as the IBM PowerPC available in commercial FPGAs. The
main components of the platform are shown in Figure 8 as follows:
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Figure 8. Intrinsic Evolution Platform

JTAG Port: This is the standard JTAG (IEEE 1149.1) serial port for boundary scan and
configuration operations. Its circuitry is implemented on the non-reconfigurable area of the
Xilinx FGPA device and is embedded in most of the Xilinx Virtex and Spartan device families.

GNAT: This is the General-purpose Native jtAg Tester component [81] which has been
developed as part of the bitstream on the reconfigurable area of the chip. It connects to the JTAG
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from one side and to the targeted circuit via a simple read/write bus interface. The bus width can
be customized to match the circuit‟s peripherals.

Evolved Circuit: This is the subject circuit to be evolved on the FPGA chip. The circuit
peripherals are connected to the read/write bus of the GNAT to receive input signals and confer
the corresponding output signals. The software components shown in Figure 8 are as follows:

GA Engine: This is a C++ based console application implemented using an object oriented
architecture. It contains classes which model the GA such as Individual and Generation classes
along with the GA parameters such as the Mutation, Crossover, and Elitism rate. This module
implements the conventional GA and is an independent component which can be replaced by any
other enhanced algorithm variations. A conventional population-based GA was selected to
demonstrate the applicability of the intrinsic genetic operators on the actual hardware. The
handshaking between the GA Engine module and the Chromosome Manipulator module is done
through a common data-structure that holds the genotype representation of the genetic
individual.

Chromosome Manipulator: This is a C-based library that contains the functional genetic
operators performed on chromosomes along with fitness evaluation functions as follows:



GetConfiguration: Populates the chromosome‟s genotype representation data-structure
from the configuration bitstream via the MRRA Module.
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PerformCrossover: Performs a probability-driven single point genetic crossover on the
two parent chromosomes. Crossover point is randomly assigned for both parents
according to a random number generator. The offspring yielded is loaded back to the
calling GA Engine.



PerformPMX: Performs a probability-driven two-point genetic partially matched
crossover (PMX) on the two parent chromosomes. Crossover points are randomly
assigned for both parents according to a random number generator. The offspring inherits
the chromosomal section between the two crossover points (Matching Section) from one
parent and the rest of the chromosomal content is inherited from the other parent. The
inheritance from the second parent is done in such a way that prevents any duplication of
the same genetic material as shown in the example in Figure. 9. In this example, the
rectangles in each chromosome represent the FPGA LUT‟s individual fields, and the
number inside the rectangle denotes the logic configuration (the bit content that the LUT
holds) assigned to that LUT. This number is assigned to the initial configuration of each
LUT in order to keep track on that configuration during the evolution process and avoid
its duplication. PMX operator was originally designed for solving permutation problems
such as the well known Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) [43, 82]. The cities in the
TSP are analogous to the LUTs in this problem. Hence the PMX operator reorders the
different configurations among the LUTs without duplicating the same configuration on
multiple LUTs. This operator is more preservative to the genetic material of the
chromosome than the conventional crossover, and therefore may find a faster
functionality refurbishment by simply assigning the original configuration of a faulty
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LUT to another unused one. This is especially true when a higher routing capability is
achieved. The offspring yielded is loaded back to the calling GA Engine.

Figure. 9. Partially Matched Crossover (PMX)



PerformOX: Performs a probability-driven two-point genetic Order Crossover (OX) on
the two parent chromosomes. Crossover points are again randomly assigned for both
parents according to a random number generator. One parent is selected and holes (i.e.
LUTs with no assigned configurations) are assigned to the LUTs that hold the same
Matching Section configurations of the other parent as shown in Figure 10b. Next, the
configurations from the Matching Section taken from the first parent are assigned to the
first LUTs from the left and the holes are then assigned to the contiguous LUTs as shown
in Figure 10c. Holes are then filled with the matching section configurations from the
other parent and the rest of the LUTs are assigned the rest of the left configurations as
shown in Figure 10d. OX operator entails similar effect as the PMX however; it carries
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out bigger shuffles in configurations across LUTs than the PMX does. Again, the
offspring yielded is loaded back to the calling GA Engine.

b.) Insert Holes

c.) Group Holes
a.) Parent Chromosomes
d.) Assign Configurations to
Holes

Figure 10. Order Crossover (OX)



PerformCX: Performs a probability-driven genetic cycle crossover (CX) on the two
parent chromosomes. No crossover points are assigned. Instead, LUT configurations
taken from one parent are selected, and in the second phase the rest of the LUT
configurations are inherited from the second parent. In the example shown in Figure 11,
and starting from the left hand side, the first configuration is assigned to the first LUT of
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the offspring. Then it continues by selecting the configuration number of the same LUT
position in the second parent chromosome. The whole process continues until all the LUT
configurations taken from the first parent are assigned as shown in Figure 11b. In the
second phase all the blank configurations are filled directly from the corresponding
locations in the second parent as shown in Figure 11c. The offspring yielded is loaded
back to the calling GA Engine.

b.) Configurations from Parent 1

a.) Parent Chromosomes

c.) Add Configurations from
Parent 2

Figure 11. Cycle Crossover (CX)



PerformMutation: Performs a probability-driven single-bit genetic mutation. A single bit
of the binary chromosome content is flipped according to the mutation probability
threshold value being exceeded by a random number generator on the interval [0,1].
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ConfigureIndividual: Maps the chromosome‟s genotype representation back into its
corresponding phenotype via the MRRA module. It then opens the host PC parallel port
and programs the FPGA device with the resultant bitstream via the JTAG port.



EvaluateInput: Receives the test input pattern from the GA Engine. The input pattern is
then applied to the circuit on chip via the GNAT module. Once the output is evaluated,
the Chromosome Manipulator module reads it and sends it back to the GA Engine for
fitness assessment.

In summary, the Chromosome Manipulator layer provides a logical abstraction of genetic
operators to the GA Engine module. This facilitates the integration of any GA at the top layer by
making the hardware implementation details transparent.

MRRA: This platform developed by our team is a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration
Architecture for Autonomous Runtime Partial Reconfiguration of FPGA devices [39]. MRRA
operations are partitioned into a Logic, Translation, and Reconfiguration layers along with a
standardized set of Application Programming Interfaces

Bitstream File: In the developed platform, an initial pre-compiled bitstream is generated using
the Xilinx CAD tools. It contains the interconnected LUTs to be configured by the platform to
evolve and realize an original circuit Design or restore functionality via Repair the functionality
sought. The platform then manipulates this bitstream file to carry out the physical mapping of the
crossover or mutation performed on the genotype representation.
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The task-flow of the platform is divided into three phases:

Initialization: This process aims at obtaining the configuration from the baseline bitstream file
which has been manually designed using the Xilinx CAD tools. As depicted in Figure 12, the GA
requests the genotype representation of the baseline configuration from the Chromosome
Manipulator layer. As a result, the Chromosome Manipulator requests the LUTs configuration
information from the bitstream file via the MRRA. The MRRA directly accesses the bitstream
file and extracts the LUTs configuration information from the column-based vertical
configuration frames using the Frame based Partial Reconfiguration Flow [39], and sends that
information back to the Chromosome Manipulator. Finally, the Chromosome Manipulator layer
restructures the bitstream data into the genotype data-structure mentioned earlier and sends it
back to the GA Engine.

GA Operations: Operations are performed by the Chromosome Manipulator module directly on
the chromosome genotype. They are invoked by the GA Engine to supply the new generation
with new individuals. When the GA Engine needs to execute a genetic operator such as the
Crossover or Mutation, it calls the PerformCrossover, PerformPMX, PerformOX, PerformCX, or
PerformMutation functions from the Chromosome Manipulator layer and passes the target
chromosome(s) data-structure. The Chromosome Manipulator layer performs the operation
requested and sends back the resultant offspring to the GA Engine.
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Figure 12. Initialization: Obtain configuration from .bit File

Fitness Evaluation which is carried out in two phases: FPGA Reconfiguration and Pattern
Evaluation as shown in Figure 13. The FPGA Reconfiguration phase starts the moment the GA
initiates the fitness evaluation process for an individual. The Chromosome Manipulator module
issues a download command to the MRRA module. The MRRA writes-back the individual‟s
physical representation to the bitstream file by directly manipulating the binary content of that
file. The bit file is then downloaded to the FPGA via the JTAG port.
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a.) FPGA Reconfiguration

b.) Pattern Evaluation

Figure 13. Fitness Evaluation: Performed in two phases a and b.

On the other hand, the Pattern Evaluation phase starts by sending the input patterns serially to the
FPGA chip via the JTAG according to the JTAG clock frequency. After that, the GNAT module
groups back the serial bits of each input and applies them to the corresponding circuit‟s input
ports. Having the circuit‟s output evaluated at the output ports, the GNAT sends it back to the
MRRA via the JTAG which then passes it to the GA via the Chromosome Manipulator layer.

A central modification to this platform might be to delegate the fitness evaluation process
completely to the AE instead of shifting testing input patterns serially through the JTAG. The
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moment the evolutionary repair is invoked at the Organic Layer, and each time a new individual
is downloaded onto the FPGA by the means of the Partial Reconfiguraion for fitness evaluation,
the AE evaluates its fitness under functional inputs while running in the TMR mode. The fitness
of the under-repair FE is evaluated using the Voter Report over a customizable window of
functional input evaluations. Doing so is expected to speed up the evolution and to eliminate the
need to have exhaustive testing patterns for each function across the multiple OU.

3.3. Summary
In summary, an efficient architecture for an autonomous organic layer capable of demonstrating
organic self-x properties including self-monitoring, self-reporting, and self-healing is presented.
The proposed design is implementable on the commercially available FGPA devices which
makes it a practically viable realization of the organic systems concepts. Moreover, an intrinsic
evolutionary platform for digital circuit repair is proposed as an integrated means of autonomous
organic system refurbishment.
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIC SELF-HEALING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In order to verify the applicability of the proposed architecture, and to identify the risks and
limitations, the organic layer has been prototyped on the actual FPGA fabric. Limitations include
the impact the AE imposes on the functional flow due to augmenting additional non-functional
monitoring modules in the datapath, the system capability to gracefully switch between different
modes according the health status, the Organic-Cognitive communication infrastructure, and
many others. The Organic Unit prototype has been implemented with Sobel video edge-detection
FE use-case, an image processing function commonly found on satellites. Moreover, the
software-hardware communication designed protocol is verified along with a complete
implementation of an intrinsic evolution platform for evolutionary refurbishment.

4.1. Video Edge-Detection Use-Case on Organic Layer
In order to test and demonstrate the Organic Unit capabilities, the Organic Unit architecture
depicted in Figure 7 was implemented on XC4VSX35 FPGA on Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter
Kit. A Sobel 2-D spatial gradient measurement video edge-detector was implemented as the
organic FE. Sobel algorithm was selected because of its simplicity compared to the other
advanced edge-detection techniques.

The developed Organic Unit prototype supports the following RARS features:



Duplex mode (2 FEs online, 1 FE standby).
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Discrepancy-based error detection.



TMR mode (3 FEs online, Voter enabled).



FE health status reporting.



Fault detection and refurbishment with duplex mode restoration.



Message-based inter-layer communication modules.

The communication protocol Experiments have shown that a transmission rate of 5mbps is
achievable using the Xilinx Parallel Cable 4. Due to the relatively small protocol message length
(typically 16-bit), the system can handle more than 300,000 messages per second per FPGA
board. Hence no communication bandwidth congestion is expected.

The use-case diagram is shown in Figure 14. The Video Source block is a regular personal
computer running a pre-recorded video and thus providing the video stream through its VGAOUT port which is connected to the VGA-IN port on the FPGA board via a standard 15-pin
VGA cable. Alternatively, a camcorder capturing live video can be used instead. The video
stream is captured and buffered by the VGA-IN module on frame basis. The edge-detected frame
produced by the FEs is sent to the AE and then is buffered and finally sent out to the target
monitor denoted by the Monitor block connected to the VGA output port of the FPGA board via
a standard 15-pin VGA cable. Communication with the Cognitive Layer is carried out through
the Dispatcher module which is connected to the PC running the cognitive Layer software

69

through the on-board JTAG port using Xilinx Parallel Cable IV. The status of each FE is also
encoded and is displayed using two on-board LEDs. The possible statuses are: online and
healthy, online and faulty, offline and healthy, and offline and faulty. Similarly, the Voter report
is also encoded and is displayed using three LEDs. The possible report messages are: no
discrepancy, FE1 discrepant, FE2 discrepant, FE3 discrepant, all discrepant, and Voter disabled
which indicates the system is running in duplex mode.

Video Source
(PC/VGA-Cam)

Monitor

Original Video Stream

Edge-Detected Video Stream

VGA

VGA

PC
Cognitive
Layer

Parallel Port

FPGA Board
Virtex-4 FPGA
Organic
Unit

Control/Status

VGA-OUT

FE-1
VGA-IN
FE-2

AE

Control

Dispatcher

FE-3

JTAG
Status

Figure 14. Video edge-detection use-case.

Fault Injection is done by introducing stuck-at one or stuck-at zero faults at an LUT output.
Special HDL was developed to define the location of the fault and its type (0 or 1) for each FE at
design-time. On board DIP switches are used for run-time fault injection into any of the three
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FEs selectively; it is also used to enable/disable the AE activities. DIP switch configurations are
shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Fault Injection DIP Switches

DIP

Purpose

1

When asserted, the organic activities are turned on. When de-asserted only functional
behavior is demonstrated. (for malfunction visibility to the human-eye)

2

Stuck-at fault injected in FE1

3

Stuck-at fault injected in FE2

4

Stuck-at fault injected in FE3

The place-and-routed design of the use-case on the FPGA fabric is shown in Figure 15. The
figure shows each FE implemented in its own Partial Reconfiguration (PR) and all FEs are
plugged into the final OU by the means of the Bus-Macros technique.

Figure 15. FE-PR and Entire OU on FPGA Fabric

Several scenarios were conducted to test the capability of the platform to accommodate and
circumvent system failures. These scenarios are listed in Table 5.
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Table 5. Use-case Testing Scenarios

Scenario 1: Fault Free

As indicated in the Cognitive Layer screenshot below, the system runs in duplex mode,
where two FEs are running the edge-detection algorithm and the third one is in „cold
standby‟ inactive mode. The system performance is at 100%. The edge detected image
is shown in Figure 16-A.
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Scenario-2: Fault injection (Single Faulty FE)

The system runs in duplex mode. DIP-switch 1 is ON, indicating that the AE is enabled
monitoring faults in the FES. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The
edge detected image in Figure 16-A shows NO faulty pixels and the quality of the
image remains the same, this is due to the AE intervention which can be summarized as
the following:

o AE detects discrepancy between FE1 and FE2.
o AE enables FE3 and changes its status from Offline to Online. It also enables the
Voter (TMR).
o Voter identifies FE1 as the culprit and its status becomes (Online and faulty)
o The output is streamed out from the majority vote result and hence no degradation
happens to the detected image.
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Scenario-3: Fault injection (Two Faulty FEs)

Starting from Scenario-2 last step, DIP-switch 3 (FE-2 fault injection) is turned ON.
The voter reports discrepant outputs of the three FEs. Nevertheless, the voter is
intelligent enough to discern the pristine FE. This is done by keeping history of
successful voting epochs. Pristine FE is the one that always voted correctly. The
detected image quality deteriorates as shown in Figure 16-B. It can be seen that
reasonable performance (81%) is still achievable with two defective FEs.

74

Scenario-4: Fault injection (Three Faulty FEs)

Starting from Scenario-3 last step, DIP-switch 4 (FE-3 fault injection) is turned ON.
The voter reports discrepant outputs of the three FEs. The voter reports three defective
FEs.

Figure 17 shows the organic layer state transitions flowchart. The sequence of events, status, and
actions that controls the organic behavior discussed earlier is depicted.
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Figure 16. Edge-detection Snap. A: Fault Free/Single Fault, B: Faulty and C:
Refurbished
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Figure 17. Self-Repair Flow Diagram
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4.2. Evolutionary Design and Repair Platform
As mentioned earlier, the organic system exploits the intrinsic evolutionary approach as a
legitimate highly flexible technique to achieve functionality regain. For that, several experiments
were performed to verify the platform‟s evolution capability. The circuit used to demonstrate the
platform workflow is a 4-bit arithmetic adder. It provides a tractable circuit for the GA to evolve
that exhibits characteristics for large arithmetic circuits including a variable amount of
redundancy and combinational logic behavior. The GA parameters used throughout the
experiments are shown in able 6. A total of 8 LUTs were used in the design experiments. This
number was increased to 13 LUTs in the repair experiment to add a redundancy margin for the
GA to evolve within. All GA parameters were extracted by running extrinsic evolution of the GA
and finding out the optimal values. The table shows the range of tested values for each parameter
along with the optimal one. Population sizes between 5 and 20 were evaluated and best results
were achieved using population size of 10. Crossover rates in the range of 30% to 90% in
increments of 10% were evaluated indicating the GA performed well when the value was near
60%. Therefore, a rate of 60% was used for the four different types of crossover used in the
experiments: Single-Point crossover, PMX, OX, and CX. Similar analysis was used to determine
baseline values for the other parameters summarized in able 6.
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Table 6. GA Parameters

Parameter
Number of LUTs for design
Number of LUTs for repair
Population Size
Mutation Rate
Crossover Rate
Tournament Size
Elitism Size

Range Evaluated
8
8-13
5-20
5%-90%
30%-90%
1-8
1-2

Value Selected
8
13
10
50%
60%
6
1

There are three types of experiments performed as follows:

Unseeded Design: In this experiment, the GA evolved the 4-bit adder circuit with only a
randomly-seeded initial population. The purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate the
capability to intrinsically evolve 100% functional circuits starting from a random bitstream. A
baseline bitstream was generated manually using Xilinx ISE Project Navigator. This bitstream
contains the 8 interconnected LUTs on which the circuit is to be evolved along with the GNAT
core connected to the JTAG component.

Seeded Design: In this experiment, the GA evolved the 4-bit adder circuit starting with a
population of partially functional seeded individuals in addition to completely random ones. The
partially functional seeds were originally fully functional designs which were altered by
deliberately exposing them to mutation operator. This arrangement emulates a fault-scenario in
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real life avionics in which the configuration bitstream is partially affected by Single Event Upset
(SEU) due to radiation burst or any other severe environmental event. Typically, scrubbing is
used to replace bitstream with an intact version stored on nonvolatile storage. However, this
experiment could operate even in the event of permanent damage to the underlying fabric and
with the absence of intact stored baseline configuration for scrubbing.

Repair: A single stuck-at fault was adopted as a case study to show the capability of the
platform to repair a faulty circuit. Two aspects should be highlighted here:

I.

Fault Injection: Since an actual fault can neither be readily nor precisely introduced into
the device, the circuit is stimulated to behave as if the fault actually exists. This technique
becomes more complicated considering the fact that the platform allows only functional
logic manipulation without the possibility of altering the device interconnects. Hence, the
bitstream was processed directly before configuring the device to modify the contents of
one LUT so that it behaves as if a stuck-at fault is present. Alternatively, in the Sobel
Edge-detector use-case, special logic was implemented to control fault injection through
on-board DIP switches as described in the previous section.

II.

Degree of Redundancy: During the initial runs, the GA failed to achieve complete repair.
It turned out that the search space given to the GA was exceedingly narrow, and
consequently, the GA failed to avoid the faulty resource by constructing alternative paths.
To remedy this limitation, redundancy was introduced by adding extra unused LUTs to
the original design. This was performed within the standard partial reconfiguration flow
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presented by Xilinx [83] which has a module-level granularity that requires each module
to be arranged at slice column level with a four-slice boundary requirement. A bus macro
is also required to establish a communication means amongst modules. Besides the
restricted flexibility due to the coarse granularity, this module-based partial
reconfiguration flow can only be controlled at a very high level during design time.
Hence, mostly depending on the Xilinx tool sets to interpret the placement and routing
process, which may encounter some illegal implementations especially when the partial
configuration module‟s size requires extensive routing resources.

For the four aforementioned crossover operators, each combined with the mutation operator; five
intrinsic evolutions were achieved for each of the three experiments: the unseeded, seeded, and
repair using the presented platform. The GA parameters listed in able 6 were used. The following
aspects were measured to quantify the capability of the platform to carry out the evolution
process:

Fm a x: The numerical measure of the fitness for the best individual of the final generation of the
run. The maximum fitness for the 4-Bit adder is calculated as shown in Eq. 1.

Fitness Max  ( No. of Input Patterns) (Output Width) …………Eq. ( 1 )

 (28 )  (5)  1280 .
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F final : The arithmetic mean for the fitness of all the individuals in the final generation of the run.

G : The total number of generation evolved during the run.
Timing Information: The timing information for each run and is divided into four metrics:

CM total : The time elapsed to perform the GA crossover and mutation during the entire run.

FE : The time elapsed to apply the input patterns and read back the corresponding outputs for
all the fitness evaluations during the entire run.

C : The average time taken by a single genetic crossover for a certain GA run. The crossover
could be a single point conventional crossover, PMX, OX, or CX.

M : The average time taken by a single genetic mutation for a certain GA run.
Experimental results are listed in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. It can be seen from
the results that the intrinsic GA operators‟ time is in the range of the micro-seconds. Operators‟
time is small compared to the fitness measurement time which is around one millisecond for
each pattern evaluation. In this dissertation the JTAG serial port is used which imposes a
substantial time delay that reaches up to 22 seconds to configure the entire device using the
Xilinx Parallel Cable III which is reduced to 1 second using the Xilinx Parallel Cable IV. This
performance overhead can be considerably reduced if other interfaces are used such as the
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SelectMap parallel port or the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP) on a System-on-Chip
(SoC) implementation using the IBM PowerPC on-chip processor.

Device programming time is high due to two main reasons; the first one is the fact that the JTAG
port was used to download the bitstream to the chip. Theoretically, the JTAG interface with the
Parallel Cable III has a maximum download speed of 300Kbps [84]. The measured data transfer
rate using JTAG in our experiments was 205Kbps because of the data transfer overhead between
the host PC and the board. On the other hand, with the Parallel Cable IV which has a maximum
download speed of 5Mbps [84], a 4.28Mbps average data transfer rate was measured in our
experiments, again due to the data transfer overhead between the PC and the board.
Alternatively, the SelectMap interface with Xilinx Virtex device family can work at a maximum
of 66MHz clock speed loading one byte per clock cycle, i.e. 528Mbps [85]. Hence the device
programming time can reach as low as 8 milliseconds if the SelectMap is used.

The second reason is due to the large bitstream file used of 548Kbytes. The partial configuration
bitstream file for the 4-Bit adder circuit along with the GNAT component is only 80Kbyte. When
this file is used instead of the full configuration bitstream the device programming time is
drastically reduced to 16 milliseconds using the JTAG with Xilinx Parallel Cable IV and to 150
microseconds using the SelectMap interface. Comparison between configuration times using the
different schemes is shown in Table 7.
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Table 7. Sobel Edge-detector Configuration Times in Various Technologies

Approach

Virtex-2 [86]
Virtex-4 Full Virtex-4 Partial
Virtex-II
Virtex-4
Virtex-4
Device
548 KB
1.633 MB
30.61 KB
Bitstream Size
parallel cable III parallel cable IV parallel cable IV
JTAG Cable
300Kbps
5Mbps
5Mbps
22000
2613
48
Config time (msec)

In Table 8, the timing measurement of the probability-driven single point crossover and mutation
operators for each run is listed. Similarly, Table 9 lists the experimental results of the
probability-driven PMX and mutation operators for each run. On the other hand, Table 10 lists
the experimental results of the probability-driven OX and mutation operators for each run, and
finally, Table 11 lists the experimental results of the probability-driven CX and mutation
operators for each run.
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Table 8. Experimental Results Summary for Single Point Crossover and Mutation

Experiment
Run
Type

Unseeded

Seeded

Repair

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

Fm a x

F final

Timing Information
(seconds)

G
CM total

1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280

1265
1260
1254
1254
1254
1263
1265
1247
1254
1254
1270
1265
1265
1260
1263

185
207
63
142
122
46
103
14
38
73
168
102
250
94
160

1.147
1.326
0.417
0.884
0.766
0.296
0.651
0.091
0.234
0.472
1.059
0.609
1.568
0.603
1.021
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FE
472
161
362
311
117
263
36
97
186
428
260
638
240
408
161

C

M

4.158 x 10-6
4.302 x 10-6
4.265 x 10-6
4.274 x 10-6
4.225 x 10-6
4.115 x 10-6
4.199 x 10-6
4.153 x 10-6
4.291 x 10-6
4.361 x 10-6
4.208 x 10-6
4.317 x 10-6
4.342 x 10-6
4.299 x 10-6
4.152 x 10-6

0.46 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.49 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.48 x 10-6
0.44 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.47 x 10-6
0.47 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.51 x 10-6
0.47 x 10-6
0.46 x 10-6
0.45 x 10-6

Table 9. Experimental Results Summary for PMX and Mutation

Experiment
Type

Unseeded

Seeded

Repair

Run

Fm a x

F final

Timing Information
(seconds)

G
CM total

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280

1255
1244
1260
1258
1254
1265
1247
1254
1251
1254
1246
1257
1265
1241
1239

258
119
109
189
85
232
140
238
56
128
430
126
239
182
145
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5.44 x 10-3
2.58 x 10-3
2.3 x 10-3
3.95 x 10-3
1.78 x 10-3
4.86 x 10-3
2.94 x 10-3
5 x 10-3
1.16 x 10-3
2.72 x 10-3
8.95 x 10-3
2.65 x 10-3
5.03 x 10-3
3.81 x 10-3
3.03 x 10-3

FE
660
312
280
490
223
589
359
618
148
336
1067
323
620
493
372

C

M

3.13 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.22 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.11 x 10-6 0.49 x 10-6
3.1 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.13 x 10-6 0.44 x 10-6
3.11 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.1 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.12 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.02 x 10-6 0.5 x 10-6
3.15 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.06 x 10-6 0.49 x 10-6
3.16 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.12 x 10-6 0.45 x 10-6
3.05 x 10-6 0.53 x 10-6
3.09 x 10-6 0.48 x 10-6

Table 10. Experimental Results Summary for OX and Mutation

Experiment
Type

Unseeded

Seeded

Repair

Run

Fm a x

F final

Timing Information
(seconds)

G
CM total

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1264
1280
1280
1280
1280
1264
1280
1276
1274

1247
1236
1218
1005
1113
1138
1177
1254
1253
1244
816
805
1037
879
943

546
253
312
485
764
319
1000
627
422
461
677
1000
533
1000
1000
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11.9 x 10-3
5.61 x 10-3
6.64 x 10-3
10.4 x 10-3
16.2 x 10-3
6.78 x 10-3
21.4 x 10-3
13.3 x 10-3
8.95 x 10-3
9.78 x 10-3
15 x 10-3
21.2 x 10-3
11.3 x 10-3
21.4 x 10-3
21.3 x 10-3

FE
1341
656
784
1244
1982
810
2484
1609
1036
1184
1700
2566
1323
2539
2511

C

M

3.15 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.22 x 10-6 0.57 x 10-6
3.16 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.2 x 10-6 0.48 x 10-6
3.14 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.15 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.18 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.14 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.15 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.16 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.3 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.14 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.15 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
3.17 x 10-6 0.48 x 10-6
3.14 x 10-6 0.48 x 10-6

Table 11. Experimental Results Summary for CX and Mutation

Experiment Type Run

Fm a x

F final

Timing Information
(seconds)

G
CM total

Unseeded

Seeded

Repair

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280
1280

1244
1265
1265
1046
1252
1248
1252
1254
1265
1260
1267
1266
1236
1265
1264

137
448
373
293
205
289
178
199
292
258
403
169
43
125
101

2.61 x 10-3
8.72 x 10-3
7.2 x 10-3
5.67 x 10-3
4.02 x 10-3
5.61 x 10-3
3.45 x 10-3
4.22 x 10-3
5.7 x 10-3
5 x 10-3
7.77 x 10-3
3.5 x 10-3
0.82 x 10-3
2.55 x 10-3
1.92 x 10-3

FE
352
1113
958
728
526
717
462
494
741
648
1057
420
110
310
259

C

M

2.79 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
2.85 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
2.83 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
2.84 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
2.83 x 10-6 0.52 x 10-6
2.85 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
2.84 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.14 x 10-6 0.53 x 10-6
2.87 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
2.85 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
2.83 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6
3.07 x 10-6 0.46 x 10-6
2.79 x 10-6 0.51 x 10-6
3.0 x 10-6 0.48 x 10-6
2.78 x 10-6 0.47 x 10-6

While the conventional single point crossover favors the genetic material that yields high fitness
and opts to find higher fitness offspring by propagating this material regardless of its
chromosomal position to the next generation, the other ordering crossover operators such as the
PMX, OX, and CX favor the combination of certain genetic material used in a certain
chromosomal position that yields high fitness and proceed to finding higher fitness individuals
by propagating that combination to the offspring. This kind of behavior leads to a finer grained
of search which may increase the GA time to converge into a solution as can be seen from the
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experimental results. It has more potential, however, to find higher quality solutions than the
conventional crossover. This explains why the number of generations needed to reach full fitness
using the conventional crossover has proved to be the fastest among the rest of the crossover
types in the three experiments unseeded design, seeded design, and repair.

In order to estimate the robustness and overall performance of each candidate chromosomes,
fitness evaluation needs to be carried out at the end of each generation. For a full set of hardware
testing vectors, its size is directly related to the total number of input bits of the testing module.
Since for a hardware bit the input will be always „0‟ or „1‟, the total possible input vector
combination will be 2 l , where l is the bit width of the total inputs. Hence the time complexity of
the fitness evaluation per generation will be O(p* 2 l ), where p is the population size of the
generation.

To measure the exact time the mutation and crossover operations take, another experiment was
carried out by setting the mutation and crossover rates to 100% to ensure that the operators are
performed with certainty. This allowed measurement of the time for each operation individually.
The results of this experiment and similar experiments using Xilinx design tool driven flow and
using JBITs are listed in Table 12. It can be seen from the results that more than seven orders of
magnitude enhancement over Xilinx design tool driven flow and three orders of magnitude
enhancement over JBITs was achieved by the developed platform.
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Table 12. GA Operators Timing (seconds)

This Platform

C
4 x 10-6

M
0.5 x 10-6

Xilinx Tool Flow

C

M
9.9

12.56

JBITS

C
4.8 x 10-3

M
4.6 x 10-3

It can also be seen from the results that the conventional single point crossover takes the highest
time amongst the other crossover types which is around 4.2 microseconds. On the other hand, the
PMX and the OX require equal time around 3.1 microseconds, while the CX requires the least
amount of time around 2.8 microseconds. It is very intuitive that the CX operator takes less time
than the others as it has no crossover points to choose and consequently has only one algorithmic
loop that produces the whole offspring chromosome. On the other hand, the other operators have
to randomly assign crossover points and treat every part of the broken chromosomes in a
different way which requires more time.

Figure 18 shows five runs that demonstrate the

capability of the platform to evolve to fully working 4-Bit adder designs starting from scratch.
The maximum fitness starts as low as 716-out-of-1280, and rapidly increases during the first few
generations.
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Run 1

Run 2

Run 3

Run 4

Run 5

1300

Max Fitness

1200
1100
1000
900
800

206

194

182

170

158

146

134

122

98

110

86

74

62

50

38

26

2

14

700

Generations

Figure 18. Unseeded Design GA Runs

Run 1

Run 2

Run 3

Run 4

Run (5)

Run 5

1290

Max Fitness

1270
1250
1230
1210
1190
1170
2

11

20

29

38

47

56

65

74

83

92

101

Generations

Figure 19. Seeded Design GA Runs

Figure 19 shows five runs where a fully working 4-Bit adder was designed from a partially
working seed. Five different seeds were used in the five runs.
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Figure 20 shows five runs in which the platform was used to repair the broken 4-Bit adder. A
stuck-at zero fault was randomly injected in the first input pin of the third LUT of the original
design. The fault injected reduces the circuit‟s fitness to 1152 out-of 1280. The fastest run was
Run 4, which reached full fitness after 94 generations.

Run 1

Run 2

Run 3

Run 4

Run 5

1290

Max Fitness

1270
1250
1230
1210
1190
1170

240

226

212

198

184

170

156

142

128

114

86

100

72

58

44

30

2

16

1150
Generations

Figure 20. Repair GA Runs

Figure 21 shows the GA evolution progress of the organic Sobel video edge-detector
refurbishment using the developed intrinsic repair platform. The edge-detector was hit by a
stuck-at one fault in an LUT output port that caused its fitness to drop from 2048 down to 1178
or 57%. As can be seen from the figure, the platform was able to achieve a refurbishment quality
of 88% in as few as 20 generations. In excess of 300 generations were needed to evolve the
remaining 12%. This behavior of fast fitness ramp-up in the early stages of the evolution process
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that shifts into a miniature steps towards approaching the full fitness is common to all GA
implementations.

Figure 21. Sobel Edge-Detector Refurbishment Evolution Progress

93

CHAPTER 5: CGT-PRUNED REPAIR TECHNIQUE

Knowledge regarding the location of hardware resource faults guides the GA search process to
converge to complete repair in fewer generations than when the knowledge is unavailable. In
particular, information regarding the location of the fault effectively reduces the search space.
The GA can also avoid creating and analyzing solutions that use the suspected faulty resource.
Information regarding the location of the fault can be obtained using a Combinatorial Group
Testing (CGT) [87] based fault location algorithms.

Formally, the CGT problem is defined as that of identifying a subset of d defectives from a set of
n items. Items can be sampled, and subset of items, known as groups can be tested to identify
the presence of defectives. Group testing techniques have been used in medical, chemical, and
electrical testing, coding, drug screening, pollution control, multi-access channel management,
and recently in data verification, clone library screening and blood testing. The fault location
problem in FPGA logic elements closely approximates the generic group testing problem. A set
of functionally-identical but physically-distinct configurations provide the groups, and evaluation
of the outputs provides the tests for the identification of defectives in the groups-under-test. The
accumulated correctness behavior of resources can be used to locate the physical resource fault.
Once sufficient information is obtained regarding the location of the physical fault, it is passed
on to the GA which can use the information to identify a refurbished solution.
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5.1. Group Testing Based Fault Location Procedure
CGT algorithms are a class of solutions to the problem of identifying individual defective
members from a large population by conducting a minimal number of tests on sub-groups or
blocks of elements. The fault-location algorithm used in this dissertation is obtained from the
Dueling with Modified Halving algorithm described in [31].

In this algorithm individual configurations are evaluated based on their output to identify
discrepancies between the expected output and the observed output. The presence of an output
discrepancy implies that the resources used by the configuration are suspect of being faultaffected.

The set of all competing configurations is represented by S.

Each competing

configuration k, 1 < k < |S| has a unique binary Usage Matrix Uk, 1 < k < p, with elements
Uk[i,j], 1 < i < m, 1 < j < n, where m and n represent the rows and columns in the device layout
respectively. Elements Uk[i,j] = 1 denote the usage of resource (i, j) by configuration k.
Discrepant outputs lead to a unit increment in the value of all H[i,j] where Uk[i,j] = 1. The
History Matrix H, with elements H[i,j] 1 < i < m, 1 < j < n, is an integer matrix used to
represent the relative fitness of individual resources. In case of a single fault, fault location is
complete when a single element in H has the maximum value in H.

The output of the fault

location procedure is the coordinates of the suspected-faulty resources. The CGT-pruned GA
presented in this dissertation utilizes the output from the fault location procedure to avoid the
suspected faulty resource during the process of searching for alternate solutions.
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5.2. CGT-Pruned Expedited Genetic Algorithm
The CGT-pruned GA presented in this dissertation utilizes resource performance information
obtained by using combinatorial group testing techniques. This information is incorporated
within the GA to evolve faster refurbishment and consequently yield higher availability. In order
to assess the advantages of the CGT-pruned genetic algorithms over previous methods, a
simulator was created. The architecture of this simulator is shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Genetic Algorithm Simulator

The simulator is a C++ based console application that consists of two main components: the
CGT procedure and the GA. The CGT algorithm uses the GNU Scientific Library (GSL) and
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simulates the fault location method. The GA is implemented using an object oriented architecture
that contains classes which model the FPGA resources with flexible geometries such as the
Configurable Logic Block (CLB) and Look-Up Table (LUT) classes, and others that model the
GA such as Individual and Generation classes. When this simulator is run in the CGT-pruned
GA mode, the CGT component simulates the desired FPGA chip and obtains resource
performance information which is an input to the GA. The GA then performs evolutionary
design or reads the Seed Configuration file and performs evolutionary repair according to the
active mode of operation. In the Conventional GA mode, the CGT component is not invoked and
no resource performance information is available to the GA. The simulator has three input files
as follows:

Settings: This file contains all the parameterized settings that control the way the simulator works
such as the geometry of the simulated FPGA chip, GA settings such as the population size and
crossover rate, and the mode of operation.

Truth Table: This file contains the input/output truth table for the circuit under evolution. This
describes the desired behavior of a fully-fit configuration and is used to evaluate the correctness
of the simulated circuit‟s outputs.

Seed Configuration: This file contains the bitstream representation of the initial configuration
that the GA should start with in case of repair, i.e. the faulty design that is sought to be repaired.
This file is not required in the design mode of operation.
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The following two output files are produced by the simulator:

Fitness Report: This file contains the history of each generation of the GA process, detailing the
maximum fitness of its best individual and its average fitness.

Best Configuration: This file contains the bitstream representation of the configuration with the
highest fitness the GA could evolve at the end of the run.

5.3. Experiments
Three experiments, each targeting a different problem, were conducted to analyze differences
between the CGT-pruned GA and conventional GAs. The first involved comparing the
performance of the two for repair. In the second, the CGT-pruned GA was enhanced using the
cell-swapping operator. The third experiment quantifies the differences in performance of the
two for the problem of designing configurations from scratch. Also, by comparing results from
the refurbishment and the design problem, the hypothesis that the repair problem is more
tractable than the design problem can be verified.

Figure 23 shows two configurations on an FPGA, where the dark squares represent resources
currently used by the configuration and the light squares represent the unused resources. The
configuration shown on the left utilizes a resource that has been affected by a fault. This
suspected faulty resource that has been identified using the CGT algorithm is indicated by a
cross. In the CGT-pruned genetic algorithm, the faulty resource is isolated and is no longer
regarded in the genetic operations that evolve a repair. Thus, all the faulty configurations which
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involve the faulty resource will be avoided. The crossover and mutation operators are used by
the GA to modify the bitstring representation of the FPGA configurations. Crossover points can
only occur on the CLB boundaries to prevent destructive intra-CLB crossover. The mutation
operator is defined as probabilistic inversions of bits in the bitstring. A mutation might change
either the functional logic implemented in the LUT, or the inter-LUT connections.

Figure 23. CGT-pruned Genetic Algorithm Repair

A total of 120 experiments were conducted to explore the advantage of the CGT-pruned genetic
algorithms in both repair and design problems in the presence of a randomly inject single stuck at
one fault on the input of an LUT. Results have shown that CGT-pruned GA yields faster
evolved solution for both cases.

In all the experiments, the circuit evolved was a 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier which is a tractable
circuit size for the GA to evolve.
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Table 13. GA Parameters

CLBs
LUTs/CLB
Population Size
Mutation Rate
Crossover Rate
Tournament Size
Elitism

15
4
25
0.05
0.4
6
2

The parameters shown in Table 13 were used in all the experiments. The GA parameters were
obtained by varying the parameters to optimize performance. Elitism, wherein two best-fit
individuals are carried forward to the next generation without any genetic modification, is used
to increase continuation of enhancements realized by the GA. A low crossover rate of 0.4 was
chosen since it was observed that higher values were too disruptive to the exploration of alternate
configurations.

Four types of experiments were conducted, and for each type, 30 identical experiments were
carried out to ensure statistical significance. In the first experiment, the multiplier was evolved
from scratch in the presence of fault using conventional GA. The same experiment was then
repeated using the CGT-pruned GA in the place of the conventional GA. In the repair
experiments, the multiplier was repaired using the conventional GA, and then again using the
CGT-pruned GA.
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The simulated FPGA geometry through all the 120 different experiments has 15 Configurable
Logic Blocks (CLBs) with each CLB containing four Look Up Tables (LUTs). Each LUT has
two inputs and one output which in turn can be configured to realize one of the OR, AND, NOR,
NAND, NOT, and XOR basic logic functions. The interconnect follows a strict Feed-Forward
topology architecture. The LUTs are numbered sequentially with the lowest numbers being
connected to the inputs. The output of LUTs with higher index numbers cannot be the inputs of
LUTs with numbers lower than them as described in [17].

The fault simulated in the

experiments was a single functional logic fault in one of the LUTs.

5.4. Results and Analysis

5.4.1. Fault Location Using CGT Algorithm
In experiments involving the CGT-pruned GAs, fault location information was gained by using
the CGT algorithm. The CGT algorithm used a simulated array of 15 CLBs, with 4 LUTs in
each CLB. Thus each Usage Matrix, Uk has 60 elements. A single functional fault was simulated
in one of the 60 LUTs on the simulated FPGA. On average, over a set of 30 fault-isolation
simulations, the procedure required only 12 evaluations to correctly identify the location of the
fault, as denoted by a single element with the maximum value in the H matrix. The number of
evaluations required by the fault-location algorithm is as low as 0.02% of the average number of
generations required by the GA to design the circuit, and 0.11% of the average number of
generations CGT-pruned GA takes to realize a complete refurbishment. Thus, the isolation
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procedure imposes a very low temporal overhead in exchange for the speedup obtained in the
refurbishment process.

5.4.2. Design in the Presence of Fault
A 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier was designed in the presence of a faulty LUT by a conventional GA
and the CGT-pruned GA. The results are listed in Table 14.

Table 14. Design of a 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier in the Presence of a Fault

Experiment Type
Circuit
Number of Experiments
Arithmetic Mean (Generations)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of the Mean
68% Confidence Interval

Conventional design
3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier
30
64500
36000
7200
[57300 → 71700]

CGT-pruned design
3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier
30
53900
37300
7450
[46450 → 61350]

The experimental results listed in Table 14 show that the CGT-pruned GA yields a complete
design after an average of 53,900 generations as opposed to the 64,500 generations required by
the conventional GA. However, this enhancement is not consistently substantial as shown by the
relatively standard deviations.
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5.4.3. Repair
This experiment analyzes the effect of incorporating resource performance information in the
GA for evolutionary repair. The results are listed in Table 15.

Table 15. Repair of a 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier

Experiment Type
Circuit
Number of Experiments
Arithmetic Mean (Generations)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of the Mean
68% Confidence Interval

Conventional Repair
3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier
30
17150
15650
2850
[14300 → 20000]

CGT-pruned Repair
3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier
30
10700
12550
2300
[8400 → 13000]

From Table 15, and as shown in Figure 24, it is seen that the CGT-pruned GA yields
substantially faster repair than the conventional GA. Again the range of the actual mean for a
high confidence level is still wide, yet not as wide as in the design case. Since GAs in general
have a probabilistic nature, the standard deviation is large which in turn widens the range of
possible values the actual mean could fall within. The standard error of the mean can be reduced
by increasing the number of experiments conducted. The 68% confidence interval ranges for the
conventional and the CGT-pruned GAs do not intersect in the repair experiment which makes the
results more statistically significant.

103

Figure 24. Repair Progress: CGT-pruned vs. Conventional GA

Figure 25 compares the performance of the CGT-Pruned GA with that of a conventional GA for
the 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier repair experiments. In experiment 15, the CGT-pruned GA requires
only 526 generations to realize a complete refurbishment, as opposed to the 66,735 required by
the conventional GA, which corresponds to a 99.2% reduction. However, in about one third of
the experiments, the CGT-pruned GA does not always outperform the conventional GA. For
example, in experiment 25, the conventional GA performs the CGT-pruned GA by refurbishing
the faulty configuration in 76.76% fewer generations. As listed in Table 15, on average, the
CGT-pruned GA requires 10,700 generations as opposed to the 17,150 generations required by
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the conventional GA to realize complete configuration refurbishment. This confirms Hypothesis
1 at a 68% confidence level.

Figure 25. CGT-pruned vs. Conventional GA Repair
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Figure 26. Three Fast Runs of the CGT-pruned GA Repair

Figure 26 shows repair progress of three runs which achieved repair within 1,200 generations,
where a maximum fitness of 160 is attained at the end of 512 generations in the best case. It can
be seen in general that the GA evolves to a relatively very high fitness within the first few
hundreds of generations, but it takes it significantly more generations to reach the maximum
fitness.

In addition to the 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier, a 2-to-4 decoder was also designed and repaired using
the CGT-pruned GA. The experimental results show that the CGT-pruned GA yields a complete
design after an average of 152 generations as opposed to the 220 generations required by the
conventional GA.

In the refurbishment experiments, the CGT-pruned GA converges to a
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complete repair in 70 generations on an average, as compared to the 102 generations required by
the conventional GA.

Experiments have quantified the benefit of the CGT-pruned genetic algorithm which yields a
completely refurbished FPGA configuration in 37.6% fewer generations on average than a
conventional GA. The CGT-pruned genetic algorithm is approximately 16% faster in the case of
designing in the presence of a fault. Benefits of the CGT-pruned GA are more pronounced in
repair than in design. This is related to the fact that the search space is reduced by eliminating
faulty FPGA logic resources from the pool of unused resources in the case of repair.
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CHAPTER 6: A NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR MISSION
SUSTAINABILITY

As discussed in Chapter 1, sustainability is the core target of the organically computing research.
It has become very imperative to build a mathematical model to quantify this property. In this
chapter, a thorough sustainability analysis is conducted and a mathematical representation is
derived to quantify system‟s sustainability property.

6.1. Sustainability Model
Figure 27 depicts the black-box diagram view of the sustainability model presented in this
dissertation. The first input is the design resource information. It provides details of the design
FPGA resources which are subject to the faults considered in the analysis. The second input is
the distribution of each fault that might affect the mission. The third input is the repair policy
information. It includes parameters such as detection and refurbishment latencies and
depreciation. The fourth input is the Availability threshold which represents the minimum
availability level below which the mission fails. The last input is the mission duration. The
outcome from the model is the quantity of unutilized reconfigurable resources, referred to the
size of the ARP introduced in Chapter 1, which need to be budgeted for in order for the subject
design to sustain its mission lifetime. Additionally, the model shows the maximum duration the
mission can sustain above the desired availability threshold given sufficient unutilized resources
are incorporated.
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Design Resource Info
Fault Distribution
Repair Policy
Availability Threshold

Sustainability
Model

Quantity of Reconfig.
Resources to Budget for

Maximum Mission Lifetime

Mission Duration

Figure 27. Sustainability Model Functional Block Diagram

As depicted in the diagram in Figure 27, Sustainability is acquired for a predetermined system
lifetime interval, opposite to the traditional unbounded perception of the term. Moreover,
Sustainability herein is not a number or a percentage associated with the system capability to
survive. The system cannot, for example be 70% sustainable, since that does not correspond to
any real-world condition. When planning a deployment in fault prone environment, the system
either overcomes all the failures throughout its mission lifetime, and hence remain sustainable,
or else it fails to maintain its minimum level of acceptable performance upon faults and as a
result be unsustainable.

It is important to note that the class of systems considered in this analysis is the non-reproducing
closed system. An electronic system is a system that has a fixed number of physical resources
identified at design time. These resources cannot reproduce or regenerate and likewise, cannot
emigrate from or to other systems outside the system‟s boundary. System resources include all
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those resources directly used by the design as well as those indirectly used resources for fault
handling modules and redundant blocks.

To analyze to the crux of the problem, lets layout some fundamental definitions pertaining
system sustainability:

f(t): Fault probability distribution density as a function of time. Whether the fault distribution
follows linear, Poisson, normal, Gaussian, binomial, hypergeometric, etc distribution, it is a
significant factor that can impact system sustainability.

Ci: Cost in unit resource which denotes the fault impact as the number of resources damaged by
that fault. Different fault types may entail different resource damage patterns and therefore may
incur different cost values. Moreover, if the repair technique employed sets resources in spatial
groups “tiles” in which when a resource within a tile becomes faulty the entire tile is marked out
faulty, then the cost is equal to the number of resources in a tile.

Rd: Resources actually utilized by the design.

Rc(t): Resources consumed as function of time. This quantity represents the number of originally
unutilized resources consumed for fault recovery at any instance of time.

Ravail(t): Resources available for repair as function of time.
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Availthr: Availability threshold which represents the minimum availability level below which the
mission fails.

T: System targeted lifetime.

Tmax: maximum duration the mission can sustain within the desired availability threshold given
sufficient Ravail.

Rrep(t): System reparability which refers to the capability of a fault-tolerant-system to repair itself
and recover from a fault. This value may degrade over time as the mission progresses.

MTTR0: Mean time to refurbish at t0, i.e. the beginning of the mission.

η: Reparability depreciating factor.

Sustainability Hypothesis: A system can be sustainable if and only if the number of resources
available for fault refurbishment at time t0, equals or exceeds the number of resources actually
needed for fault recovery throughout the mission lifetime T as shown in Eq. (2). This statement
assumes the capability of the repairing mechanism to always achieve fault repair given the
availability of resources. The characteristic that such capability to repair degrades over time as
the system undergoes faults is taken into account in the subsequent discussion.
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n T

Ravail (n )   Rc (t )

Eq. (2)

n

Proof: By contradiction.

The expression shown in Eq. (2) is a special case which assumes a discrete Rc(t). However, fault
incidents are modeled to occur with a continuous probability distribution function in time. If the
repair process is triggered only at discrete points in time corresponding to a “periodic check”
procedure, then Eq. (2) still holds true. If otherwise, then Eq. (2) is transformed to reflect the
general case Eq. (3).

n T

Ravail (n ) 

 R (t )dt
c

Eq. (3)

t n

Re-writing Eq. (3) into a ratio format, we get the expression shown in Eq. (4).

R

avail
n T

(n)

1

Eq. (4)

 R (t )dt
c

t n

Hence, a system could be sustainable if and only if the ratio in Eq. (4) is satisfied. Rc(t) is the
number of resources consumed on system recovery at time t. Since this is a forward-looking
value that can only be measured with certainty after such event occurs, a probabilistic model
~
Rc (t ) is used to approximate the number beforehand.
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Definition of Resource Consumption Estimator:

~
Rc (t ) : Estimates the number of resources to be consumed on system recovery at time t.

Given the fault probability density function (pdf) and the cost associated with the fault event we
obtain an estimate of the number of resources consumed on system recovery over T as shown in
Eq. (5).

n T

I
~
 Rc (t )dt  T  i Ci

Eq. (5)

i 1

t n

Where i is the rate of the fault of the type “i”. Fault rate is the reciprocal of the Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF).



1
MTTF

Eq. (6)

MTTF can be calculated from the fault‟s pdf using the analysis which follows. From the
probability theory, the expected value of a random variable x is given by:



E[ X ] 

 xf ( x)dx

Eq. (7)



Since the random variable discussed herein is time, the negative part of the integration is omitted
as shown in Eq. (8):
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MTTF  E[T ]   tf (t )dt

Eq. (8)

0

As a result, Eq. (4) becomes:

R

avail
n T

(n)

~
 Rc (t )dt

 1,

t n

~
substituting for Rc (t ) from Eq. (5) and Eq. (8):

Ravail ( n )
Ci

I

T 
i 1

1

Eq. (9)

 tf (t )dt
i

n

If f(t) represents the resource fault pdf instead of the design fault pdf, Eq. (9) becomes:

Ravail ( n )
Ci Rd

I

T 
i 1

1
Eq. (10)

 tf i (t )dt
n

Eq. (10) does not take into account the fact that unutilized resources are fault prone too. Hence,
it becomes:
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I

T

Ravail ( n )
1
Ci [ Rd  Ravail ( n )]


 tf (t )dt

i 1

Eq. (11)

i

n

Let ρ denote the faulty resource ratio throughout the mission:

I

Ci

i 1

 tf (t )dt

  T 

Eq. (12)

i

n

Rewriting Eq. (11) accordingly:

Ravail ( n )



1 

1

Eq. (13)

Rd

Eq. (13) hereafter is called the Sustainability Test Ratio (STR). It holds true under the following
assumptions:

Assumption 1: Faults are independent.

Assumption 2: Successful reparability given sufficient number of unutilized resources.

Assumption 3: Constant fault arrival rate. Most common analysis assumes the “Exponential
Failure Law” in which the fault rate is assumed constant. This is based on the bathtub curve
relationship between the fault rate and time where the fault rate is very high in the beginning
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“Infant Mortality Phase” then it stabilizes “Useful Life Period” and finally it grows high again
“Wear-Out Phase.”

Assumption 4: MTTR < MTTF. Once MTTR becomes greater than MTTF, the system becomes
unavailable.

6.1.1. Combining Multiple Faults

When multiple independent fault types exhibit different pdfs impact the same resource type with
the same cost factor, then f(t) that represents the combined pdf of all the faults can be obtained to
simplify the analysis. For example, if we have two independent types of faults, the combined pdf
is calculated as follows:

f (t )  f1 (t )(1  f 2 (t ))  f 2 (t )(1  f1 (t ))  f1 (t ) f 2 (t )

Eq. (14)

To limit the scope of this analysis to a tractable boundary, the single fault model is assumed. In
the single fault model, only one fault can occur at a certain instance of time. In that case, the
exclusivity of fault occurrence makes faults no longer independent. Under the single fault
model, Eq. (14) reduces to:

f (t )  f1 (t )(1  f 2 (t ))  f 2 (t )(1  f1 (t ))
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Eq. (15)

For N different pdfs and under the single fault model, the combined pdf becomes:



N


f (t )    f i (t ) (1  f n (t )) 
i 1 
n 1

n i


N

Eq. (16)

Substituting in Eq. (12), the failed resource percentage throughout the mission for the combined
faults becomes:

 combined  T

C


N


 f i (t ) (1  f n (t )) dt
0 t 
i 1 
n 1

n i




Eq. (17)

N

6.1.2. Resource Recycling
When a fault occurs, the resources impacted can be affected by the fault differently. Some
resource can be totaled while others could become partially broken. For example, when a TDDB
fault occurs in a 4-input LUT in an FPGA chip on one of its input pins, it can cause a stuck-at
fault on that input port. This incident renders that LUT failing to serve its functionality as a 4input function generator. Nevertheless, this same defective LUT can still be used in another part
of the system logic as a 3-input function generator that doesn‟t exploit the faulty input as shown
in Figure 28 below.
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Figure 28. Resource Recycling

Nonetheless, not every failed resource may be recyclable. For example, a stuck-at-(zero, one or
open) fault at the output pin of an LUT leaves that output insensitive to its inputs variations and
hence makes it un-refurbishable for use as any downgraded part and consequently averts its
leveragability. Another example is the fault that causes a stuck-at-open or a slow switching gate
on any of the LUT‟s input ports. This creates a meta-stability behavior in the address decoding
logic with which output consistency becomes no longer guaranteed.
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Upon repair, unused resources could be used by the repair mechanism to replace broken ones.
This loss of preserved resources is considered resource consumption or positive-cost in the
closed system model. Likewise, and again upon repair, some partially broken resources which
have been already retired and deemed unusable might be recycled and rehabilitated again after
being knocked out in previous repair episodes. This reemployment of a previously retired
resource is considered resource production or negative-cost in this context. Reflecting this
argument to the model we obtain the new ρ shown in Eq. (18) below:

I

 T
i 1

C

iconsumed

 Ci produced





 tf (t )dt

Eq. (18)

0

6.1.3. Reparability and its Relation to Sustainability
System‟s reparability refers to the capability of the fault-tolerant-System to repair itself and
recover at the incident of a fault. Reparability degrades exponentially by time as the system
undergoes faults during its operational lifetime. When system is placed under repair, the services
the system presents become unavailable during the repair process. Hence, it is not enough for a
sustainable system to repair itself upon fault occurrences but equally importantly do that in a
timely manner that maintains its availability. System availability in this context is the percentage
of time the system is delivering its services as shown in Eq. (19).
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Availabili ty 

MTTF
MTTF  MTTR

Eq. (19)

As the system might be prone to multiple fault types, the more generic availability expression is
given in Eq. (20) below.

Availabili ty  1  Unavialability
I
MTTRi
 1 
i 1 MTTFi  MTTRi

Eq. (20)

The summation in the equation above adds up the percentage of time the system is unavailable
due to all subject fault types. From the discussion in section-2.3, we will only consider TDDB
and EM hard faults. The availability equation including these faults is shown in Eq. (21).


MTTRTDDB
MTTREM
Availabili ty  1  

 MTTFTDDB  MTTRTDDB MTTFEM  MTTREM





Eq. (21)

TDDB and EM faults are repaired using complicated techniques such as cell swapping and
Genetic Algorithms or re-placement and routing. Time to repair in such cases has an increasing
trend with time. The system undergoes hard faults as time goes by and that decreases the number
of possible solutions for the repair mechanism to restore lost functionality. This leads to
increasing MTTR and hence a decaying system Availability over time. The increase in MTTR
depends on the repair mechanism. However, in general it increases exponentially with time as
shown in Eq. (22).
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MTTR(t )  MTTR0 et

Eq. (22)

Where MTTR0 is the initial mean time to repair at the beginning of the mission and λ.t is
basically the cumulative number of faults the system has had up to time t. As a result, system
Availability becomes a reducing function with time as shown in Eq. (23).



MTTRTDDB (t )
MTTREM (t )

Availabili ty (t )  1  

MTTF

MTTR
(
t
)
MTTF

MTTR
(
t
)
TDDB
TDDB
EM
EM



Eq. (23)

If the minimum acceptable availability for a given mission is denoted by Availthr, then
Availablity(t) ≥ Availthr, t Є [0,Tmax] is desired. Substituting for Availthr in Eq. (23), Eq. (24) is
obtained:


MTTRTDDBo eTDDBTDDBTmax
MTTREMo eEM EM Tmax
Availmin  1  

TDDBTDDBTmax
MTTFEM  MTTREMo eEM EM Tmax
 MTTFTDDB  MTTRTDDBo e


 Eq. (24)


To solve Eq. (24), let k  1  Availmin , C1=MTTRTDDB0, X1=ηTDDB . λTDDB, Y1 = MTTFTDDB, C2 =
MTTREM0, X2 = ηEM . λEM, Y2 = MTTFEM,

Substituting in Eq. (24) we get:

K

C1e X1Tmax
C2 e X 2Tmax

Y1  C1e X1Tmax Y2  C2 e X 2Tmax

Let z  eTmax , Eq. (25) becomes:
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Eq. (25)

(1  k )C1Y2 z x1  (1  k )Y1C2 z x2  (2  k )C1C2 z ( x1  x2 )  kY1Y2  0

Eq. (26)

The polynomial equation can be solved to obtain Tmax which represents the maximum lifetime in
which the subject system maintains Availmin. If only one fault type is considered for example,
Tmax can be simply calculated using Eq. (27).

Tmax 

1  Availmin MTTF 
ln 

  Availmin MTTR0 
1

Eq. (27)

As a result, a system is anticipated to be sustainable if and only if T ≤ Tmax and STR ≥ 1. In
the next section, these metrics are applied to realistic benchmark circuits for illustration.
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6.2. MCNC Benchmarks Case Study
To illustrate the sustainability model, we consider the circuits in MCNC benchmark set. Table 16
lists the resource utilization numbers of the benchmark circuits implemented on Xilinx Virtex-4
XC4VSX35 FPGA device.

Table 16. MCNC Benchmark Circuits on Xilinx Virtex-4 xc4vsx35 FPGA

Circuit
alu4
spex2
spex4
ex1010
misex3
seq
spla
pdc

Slices
331
459
441
452
357
480
482
338

LUTs
645
904
775
754
672
895
890
616

IOB
22
41
28
20
28
76
62
56

Gates
4005
5502
4995
4857
4152
5457
5841
4071

As we are targeting harsh environment and stressful operating conditions, we obtained the MTTF
numbers for TDDB and EM faults for a 90-nm technology node from [68, 71, 72]. From [72],
table-19 shows the high sensitivity of the MTTF numbers to temperature. For example, the
MTTF of XC3S5000 device drops from 49 years down to 3 years when the temperature rises
from 85°C to 125°C. In [71], the authors considered the worst case numbers in their analysis.
Their results show a TDDB failure rate of 10% LUT/year and EM failure rate of 0.2%/year in the

123

first 12-years of the MCNC benchmark circuits. On the other hand, [68] reported less sever
failure rates. For the sake of analysis and without the loss of generality, we considered two sets
of failure rate values for harsh environments: a conservative of (λTDDB 1%/year, λEM 0.2%) and a
pessimistic of (λTDDB 5%/year, λEM 0.4%). The pessimistic numbers are obtained by prorating the
rates from [71] considering a space mission where extreme temperatures may be encountered as
satellites shined upon or shadowed by sun with no atmosphere.

Genetic Algorithms are considered as the repair mechanism. Without the loss of generality,
we will assume that all the configuration bits are “essential bits” i.e. bits that make the design
erroneous when flipped. This is a strictly conservative assumption that can be relaxed given the
mission criticality. This can be replaced by a de-rating factor if tools that can extract the essential
bits of a design are available such as COSMIC, SEUPI, or Essential Bit Technology from Xilinx.
Moreover, we will assume that Ci  1, i  I . This means when a fault occurs, it affects one
resource. In reality, a fault may affect parts of the resource. E.g. a TDDB fault in one transistor
of an LUT may damage one of its SRAM cells and not necessarily the entire array. Initially,
let‟s assume that the faulty LUT is completely unusable “worst case” and hence no resource
recycling is considered i.e. C produced  0 . In the GA used, the circuit is divided into N groups of
contiguous resources called Tiles. Each tile has a Concurrent Error Detection CED mechanism
to detect erroneous outputs. GA convergence time grows exponentially with increased number of
genomes in the chromosomal representation. Hence, partitioning the design into multiple tiles,
each evolved separately, substantially reduces the GA scalability issues. Redundant resources are
sparse across the design in Amorphous Resource Pool ARP arrangement. Resources in ARP do
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not have a designated functionality in design. GA makes use of ARP resources to restore lost
functionality due to fault by evolving a new functional bitstream from the FPGA fabric after
taking into account the fault. A C++ simulator was built to evaluate the GA convergence time
for a tile of 40-LUTs with 1 to 8 faults. The GA parameters are listed in Table 17. They were
selected based on preliminary runs to evaluate the optimal set of parameters for the problem in
hand.

Table 17. ARP-based GA Parameters

Parameter
Population Size
Mutation Rate
Crossover Rate
Tournament Size
Elitism

Value
50
0.5%
60%
5
2

The GA convergence time is translated from simulation generations into intrinsic evolution
time using numbers previously obtained in [40]. An Arena discrete simulation model was built
for each of the aforementioned MCNC benchmarks to evaluate the reparability decay based on
the GA simulations. The simulation points were fitted into corresponding exponential curve.
MTTF and MTTR results for the conservative and pessimistic cases are listed in Table 18 and
Table 19 respectively. Should another repair mechanism be considered, similar experiments need
to be conducted to evaluate the reparability decay expression and then be plugged into the
model.
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Table 18. MCNC Benchmark Circuits ARP-based GA Reparability Decay (Conservative)

Circuit
alu4
spex2
spex4
ex1010
misex3
seq
spla
pdc

MTTFTDDB
0.155
0.1106
0.129
0.1326
0.1488
0.1117
0.1124
0.1623

Conservative: λTDDB=1%, λEM=0.2%
Time unit: years
MTTRTDDB(t)
MTTFEM
0.2214t
1.97e
0.7752
2.95e0.1783t
0.5531
0.1904t
2.77e
0.6452
0.1852t
2.76e
0.6631
0.1709t
2.66e
0.744
2.25e0.2307t
0.5587
2.24e0.2294t
0.5618
0.1687t
2.86e
0.8117

MTTREM(t)
1.97e0.0443t
2.95e0.0357t
2.77e0.0381t
2.76e0.037t
2.66e0.0342t
2.25e0.0461t
2.24e0.0459t
2.86e0.0337t

Table 19. MCNC Benchmark Circuits ARP-based GA Reparability Decay (Pessimistic)

Circuit
alu4
spex2
spex4
ex1010
misex3
seq
spla
pdc

MTTFTDDB
0.031
0.0221
0.0258
0.0265
0.0298
0.0223
0.0225
0.0325

Pessimistic: λTDDB=5%, λEM=0.4%
Time unit: years
MTTRTDDB(t)
MTTFEM
1.1072t
1.97e
0.3876
0.8914t
2.95e
0.2765
0.9518t
2.77e
0.3226
2.76e0.9261t
0.3316
0.8544t
2.66e
0.372
1.1534t
2.25e
0.2793
2.24e1.1469t
0.2809
0.8433t
2.86e
0.4058
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MTTREM(t)
1.97e0.0886t
2.95e0.0713t
2.77e0.0761t
2.76e0.0741t
2.66e0.0684t
2.25e0.0923t
2.24e0.0918t
2.86e0.0675t

First the model is applied to calculate Tmax for several AvailThr values [99.6% – 80%] where
complete refurbishment was mandated given the conservative deployment parameters listed in
Table 18. The results are depicted in Figure 29. The model is then used to calculate Ravail lower
bound values required to sustain the corresponding Tmax. The results are depicted in Figure 30.
As can be inferred from the results, as the AvailThr is relaxed to lower values, the mission
sustains longer durations. For instance, spex2 benchmark deployed in such an environment with
the aforementioned GA technique employed, and Availthr of 99% is anticipated to sustain for 5
years during which it will require an ARP size of around 50 un-utilized reconfigurable resources
for repair. The same mission sustainable duration drops down to a 1 year for a Availthr of 99.6%.
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Figure 29. MCNC Tmax vs. Availability (Conservative, QOR: 100%, Simplex)
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It can also be inferred from Figure 29 and Figure 30 that in general the missions with smaller
designs are sustainable for longer periods. Yet they require ARP sizes which makes sense
because they will sustain longer and hence will lead to more refurbishment episodes.
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Figure 30. Resource Required for Refurbishment (Conservative, QOR: 100%, Simplex)

Availability threshold requirements vary from one mission to another. For example, if the
mission involves a real-time live broadcast such as audio/video conversations or surveillance
missions in which continuous coverage is sought after, high availability threshold is required.
Whereas, if it is a data collection and transmission task in which there is little time sensitivity
associated, a relatively low availability threshold can be tolerated. Moreover, although high
availability thresholds might appear sufficient, the implied downtime might be more substantial
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when taking the mission duration into consideration. For example an availability threshold of
99% implies a downtime of 15-minutes a day, 876-hours in a 10-year mission, and a complete 1
year in a 100-year mission.

In order to extend mission lifetime in which high availability thresholds are sustained, the
organic GA-based RARS architecture described in Chapter 3 can be used. Upon failure of one
Functional Element (FE), the Autonomic Element (AE) places the system into triplex mode. This
will guarantee a correct output if at least two of the three FEs are working properly. This
arrangement leads to increased fault tolerance in the system as a whole, and consequently results
in an extended mission lifetime with high availability threshold sustained.

In order to better understand the advantage of using the RARS scheme to extend the mission
lifetime, let the availability of the three FEs be: A1, A2, and A3 respectively. Then the
availability of the organic unit becomes:

ARARS  A1 A2 (1  A3 )  A1 A3 (1  A2 )  A2 A3 (1  A1 )  A1 A2 A3

Eq. (28)

Eq. (28) combines the incidents in which the three or any two of the three FEs are available.
Since the three units are identical and are implemented on the same device, it is reasonable to
assume that A1 = A2 = A3. In this case Eq. (28) becomes:

ARARS  3 A2  2 A3
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Eq. (29)

From Eq. (29) above, if the mission availability threshold requirement is 99.9% for example,
then each unit needs to maintain a threshold of only 98% which is a considerable gain. Figure 31
and Figure 32 show the extended mission lifetime of the MCNC benchmarks under RARS setup
and the resource requirements respectively. It can be seen from the figure that higher availability
levels such as 99.99% that were intractable in the simplex configuration are now achievable
under RARS. Another look at the spex2 benchmark numbers with RARS configuration, it can be
seen that the same reference point of 99.6% Availthr, TMax went up from 1 year in simplex to
more than 9 years in triplex which represents an order of magnitude enhancement.
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Figure 31. MCNC Benchmarks Tmax versus Availability (Conservative, 100%QOR,
RARS)
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The extended mission lifetime due to RARS does not come at no expense, on the contrary, it
entails area and power penalties over the simplex configuration. From sustainability point of
view, RARS scheme requires larger ARP sizes in order to refurbish the three units. Figure 32
shows the number of resources needed for refurbishment for the RARS version of the circuits
from the MCNC benchmark. Considering spex2 circuit again, the resources required went up
from 11 in simplex to 300 under TMR for 99.6% Availthr. This is not solely due to RARS
topology, but also due to the extended mission lifetime under RARS which incurs more
refurbishment episodes.
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Figure 32. Resource Required for Refurbishment (Conservative, 100%QOR, RARS)

Another important attribute to consider is the Quality-Of-Refurbishment (QOR), which
represents the fitness level at which refurbished design is qualified for functional operation. In
131

many cases, mission can still make use of a partially refurbished design. For example, in video
processing applications the system may be useful despite the missing or clobbered few pixels in
a frame. Since fitness is what guides the evolutionary search, the GA focuses on the genes of
features that give the highest contribution to the fitness of the individuals. These genes - quite
interestingly - converge relatively early in the evolution process and then it takes most of the GA
time to resolve the remaining finer parts of the problem. This property is clearly inferred from
the results listed in the fourth column in Table 20.

Table 20. ARP-based GA Evolution Results

# Faults
1
2
3
4

Ave. # Generations Ave. # Generations % of the GA Runtime
95% Fitness
100% Fitness
to evolve 95% Fitness
114
3962
2.88%
1230
31352
3.92%
3920
38601
10.16%
9238
63307
14.59%

5

11958

88746

13.47%

6

19527

133248

14.65%

7

31887

200066

15.94%

8

51981

290643

17.88%

# Runs
100
50
50
30
Interpolated
(Curve Fitting)
Interpolated
(Curve Fitting)
Interpolated
(Curve Fitting)
10

Figure 33 shows how various MCNC benchmark lifetimes are substantially extended when
repair process stops once partial refurbished designs with QOR of 95% are evolved.
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Figure 33. MCNC Benchmarks Tmax versus Availability (Conservative, QOR: 95%,
Simplex)

Considering spex2 benchmark numbers again, it can be seen that the same reference point of
99.6% Availthr, TMax went up from 1 year to about 12 years. It goes further up to 19 years with
RARS and QOR of 95% as shown in Figure 34. Similar results were obtained for the
pessimistically severe environment parameters listed in Table 19. The pessimistic numbers are
discussed for the real-life use-case in the following section.
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Figure 34. MCNC Tmax versus Availability (Conservative, 95%QOR, RARS)

6.3. Sustainability of a Realistic Mission Use-Case
FPGAs have been commonly deployed in space. Examples are plenty such as MARS Rovers [88],
THEMIS [64], NASA DAWN [89], SpaceCube [90], and many others. There is a policy for all
future US space missions to be "reprogrammable". This indicates the growing importance
autonomous FPGA-based systems are gaining in this domain.

The use-case presented in this section is based on the MESSENGER space mission [91]. This is
an on-going 8-year mission to explore planet Mercury. The harshness of the environment this
mission undergoes is immense. The sunny side of the planet is at (800°F) while the dark side is
at (-300°F). Due to the limited payload technical details, we are hypothesizing an FPGA payload
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of the edge-detector design described in Chapter 3 under the organic GA-based RARS
architecture. A RARS-based 256x256pixels 50MHz Sobel Video Edge Detector implemented on
XCV4SX35 Xilinx Vertex-4 FPGA is considered. RARS can run under simplex, duplex, or
triplex Functional Element (FE) configurations depending on the fitness of its FEs and the
resource availability. It implements intrinsic GA that places the actual FPGA chip in the loop for
online fitness assessment. Evolution takes place using the random single point crossover and
mutation genetic operators. After partitioning the edge-detector‟s design into ARP tiles of 40LUT each, and using the GA times obtained in [40] after scaling to Vertex-4 and the partial
reconfiguration latency from [92], we obtained MTTR(t) = 0.571e0.0306λt. GA parameters used are
listed in Table 17. The mission is assumed to be tolerant to soft faults through radiationhardening techniques and through scrubbing inherent in RARS. Since the MTTRsoft <<
MTTRhard, we are not including soft-faults in the analysis.

Again, we used the MTTFTDDB and MTTFEM values reported in [71] which corresponds to the
same 90-nm technology node. Using the sustainability model, we obtained the results for the
conservative and pessimistic environments shown in Table 21 and Table 22 respectively.
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Table 21. RARS Sobel Edge-Detector with ARP-based GA Sustainability Results
(Conservative)

Conservative: λTDDB=1%, λEM=0.2%
Time unit: years
Variable Model Inputs
Constant Model
avail
Sustainable R
Tmax
(LUT)
Inputs
QOR MTTRTDDB(t) MTTREM(t) AvailThr
×
T=8
99.99%
53
2.71
100% 6.4E-4e0.156t 6.4E-4e0.032t
MTTFTDDB=0.17
99.9%

231 10.9
MTTFEM=0.83
Rd=600
95% 6.5E-5e0. 183t 6.5E-5e0. 037t 99.99%

289 13.27
LUT/FE

Table 22. RARS Sobel Edge-Detector with ARP-based GA Sustainability Results (Pessimistic)

Conservative: λTDDB=5%, λEM=0.4%
Time unit: years
Variable Model Inputs
Constant Model
avail
Sustainable R
(LUT)
Inputs
QOR MTTRTDDB(t) MTTREM(t) AvailThr
×
99.6%
61
×
90%
423
T=8
100% 6.4E-4e0.782t 6.4E-4e0.063t
×
80%
520
MTTFTDDB=0.03
×
MTTFEM=0.42
50%
722
Rd=600
×
99.6%
356
LUT/FE
×
95% 6.5E-5e0.729t 6.5E-5e0.073t 90%
761
50%

1415
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Tmax
0.60
3.52
4.15
5.30
3.05
5.5
8.15

As can be seen from the results in Table 21, where conservative deployment conditions are
assumed, the design can sustain the 8-year mission with 99.9% availability and QOR of 100%
under RARS configuration. Furthermore, it can sustain that level of performance for around
11years. It requires an ARP of 231 resources to be budgeted for refurbishment. The Availability
degradation and ARP resources consumed during the 8-year Messenger mission with the
hypothetical Sobel Edge-detector in RARS are shown in Figure 35.

Figure 35. Sobel Edge-detector Availability and ARP Consumption (Conservative)

For QOR of 95%, which is equivalent to 3k bad pixels in an edge detected frame of 65k-pixels,
the mission can sustain up to 13.27 years. A triplex configuration with modules of individual
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QOR of 95% has a higher resultant QOR on the voted output given the probability of different
failure articulation amongst the three modules. Therefore, the numbers above represent the worst
case values.

On the other hand, if we assume the pessimistically severe conditions which might represent the
conditions in which the satellite is close to the sun-shined upon surface of Mercury, we notice
that mission sustainability drops to significantly shorter periods. As can be seen in Table 22, with
no QOR degradation, the design could barely sustain 99.6% availability for as short as 0.6 years.
The longest period the design is able to sustain is around 5-years with 50% availability. This
means a downtime of 2.5years. To achieve that, an ARP size of 722 resources is needed which is
40% of the actual design size in triplex configuration. The mission is only sustainable QOR of
95% and availability threshold of 50% is tolerable. Although this might be considered a very
poor system performance, yet, under such severe conditions, where aging is expedited at such
high rates, systems typically become un-usable. With the fault tolerance built in RARS, the
system will intermittently continue capturing images 50% of the time for Mercury with QOR of
95% which is by far better than total shutdown. The Availability degradation and ARP resources
consumed during the 8-year Messenger mission with the hypothetical Sobel Edge-detector in
RARS under the pessimistically sever conditions are shown in Figure 36.

Moreover, higher availability can be sustained at the expense of quality. Hence, using the
sustainability model presented herein, such Availability-QOR trade-offs can be analyzed and
favored between according to the mission needs at design time.
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Figure 36. Sobel Edge-detector Availability and ARP Consumption (Pessimistic)

Besides the sustainability benefits RARS offers, it also incurs less power consumption compared
to the widely-adopted Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) industry standard. Due to the
capability to toggle between duplex and triplex modes, RARS consumes less dynamic active
power over TMR. In order to quantify the power benefits of RARS, we will consider the TMR
platform described in [16] augmented with our enhanced intrinsic evolution. A percentage of
33% power savings result from RARS when the organic unit is running in duplex mode. RARS
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operates in duplex when the three FEs are healthy and available. Hence, the probability of
running in duplex mode denoted by Pduplex is shown in Eq. (30).

Pduplex  A1 A2 A3

Eq. (30)

From Table 21, RARS is able to attain AvailThr of 99.9% for the 8-year mission to Mercury
under conservative failure model. This requires Availability of 98.2% for each individual FE
using Eq. (29). Since the three FEs have identical Availability, Pduplex = 94.7%. This means that
RARs consumes 33% less active power during 7.5 years out of the 8-year mission lifetime over
TMR. Since Availability is a decreasing function with time as shown in Eq. (24), similarly power
savings are also decreasing with time as the system spends more time in triplex mode.

It is worth mentioning that we don‟t consider Availability numbers less than 50% for triplex
voting systems. The availability of the entire system falls below the availability of a single
module under simplex configuration once the availability of the individual modules falls below
50%. This can be inferred from Eq. (29).
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This dissertation introduces a novel sustainable autonomic architecture for organically
reconfigurable FGPA-based computing systems. The following sections summarize the work
done, provide research-related discussions on points of interest, and identify several directions
for future extensions to this work.

7.1. Technical Summary
A novel architecture consists of a hardware-based organic layer and a software-based cognitive
layer is presented. Components at the organic layer are organized into overlapping functional
groups called Organic Units (OU). Each OU bears responsibility for a particular set of missionrelevant tasks. Self-monitoring and self-healing is demonstrated at the OU level. Within the
cognitive layer, monitoring and diagnostic processes continually track the behavior of these
functional groups and determine whether their behavior characteristics fall within expected
profiles.

Challenges include the AE impact on the functional flow due to augmenting additional nonfunctional monitoring modules within the datapath, the system capability to gracefully switch
between different modes according the health status, Organic-Cognitive communication
infrastructure, and others were addressed and undertaken. To verify the architecture validity, an
organic layer is prototyped on XC4VSX35 FPGA on Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter Kit. A Sobel
2-D spatial gradient measurement video edge-detector was implemented as the organic
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functional element use-case. This represents a class of applications commonly found on
satellites. Moreover, the software-hardware communication mechanism is implemented and
verified along with a complete implementation of an intrinsic evolution platform for evolutionary
repair. Stuck-at one and stuck-at zero hardware faults are introduced in several potential
scenarios. An appropriate and smooth transition from the different redundancy modes is
demonstrated.

A 16-bit wide serial message-based communication protocol between the cognitive and organic
layers is developed. Experiments have shown that a transmission rate of 5mbps is achievable
using the Xilinx Parallel Cable 4. The efficiently concise protocol message allows the system to
handle more than 300,000 messages per second per FPGA board. Hence no communication
bandwidth congestion is observed.

A Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based hardware/software platform for intrinsic evolvable hardware is
designed and evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks.
Dynamic bitstream compilation for enhanced mutation and crossover operators is achieved by
directly manipulating the bitstream using a layered toolset. Experimental results on the edgedetector organic system prototype have shown complete organic online refurbishment after a
hard fault. In contrast to previous toolsets requiring many milliseconds or seconds, an average of
0.47 microseconds is required to perform the genetic mutation, 4.2 microseconds to perform the
single point conventional crossover, 3.1 microseconds to perform Partial Match Crossover
(PMX) as well as Order Crossover (OX), 2.8 microseconds to perform Cycle Crossover (CX),
and 1.1 milliseconds for one input pattern intrinsic evaluation. These represent a performance
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advantage of three orders of magnitude over the JBITS software framework and more than seven
orders of magnitude over the Xilinx design flow. Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) technique
was combined with the conventional GA in what is called CGT-pruned GA to reduce repair time
and increase system availability. Results have shown a substantial speedup enhancement of up to
37.6% convergence advantage using the pruned technique.

Graceful degradation was achieved with the existence of multiple faults and relatively fast
refurbishment of 95% of functionality in the few hundreds of generations has resulted in fast
system recovery even under multiple faults even when the three functional elements were
malfunctioning.

Lastly, in this dissertation a quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based
reparable systems is formulated. This model estimates at design-time the resources required for
refurbishment in order to meet mission availability, quality and lifetime requirements in a given
fault-prone ecosystem. This model is applied to circuits from the MCNC benchmark set with
variations of parameters for illustration. Results show the estimated capability of these designs to
sustain harsh environments with the means of GA-based evolutionary repair. Various
Availability, Longevity, and Quality trade-offs are discussed. Additionally, the sustainability of a
real-life space mission is analyzed. The analysis demonstrates how mission‟s sustainability and
useful lifetime can be extended by exploiting FPGA resources available aboard when applied to
our organic sustainable platform. Results show how mission availability drops from 99.9% to
50% with 5% degradation in quality in order to sustain an 8-year mission as the aging-induced
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failure rates jump from conservative value (MTTFTDDB=0.17years , MTTFEM=0.83years) to rather
pessimistic values (MTTFTDDB=0.03years , MTTFEM=0.42years).

Furthermore, un-utilized resources budgeted for refurbishment purposes are arranged into
Amorphous Resource Pools (ARP) are estimated using the model. The overhead of ARP can
range from relatively small values of 12% in the conservative environment up to large
percentages of 78% in the pessimistic assumed environment on top of the triplex overhead to
cover the loss in resources due to hard faults.

7.2. Future Work
The work presented in this dissertation introduces a comprehensive platform that closes the loop
from theory, to implementation, and ending by evaluation and analysis. However, as in other
scientific fields, the research does not stop at a certain point, and the call for enhancement and
advancement shall go on. Likewise, the work herein builds on previous research efforts and
technology improvements, and also serves as a framework for future efforts to carry out new
breakthroughs and research directions. Below are few directions that I would like to pursue
within my post-graduate research activities:

i.

Complete System-on-Chip (SoC) Platform:

The organic architecture implementation presented in this dissertation incorporated a PC to
host the cognitive layer software stubs and the GA engine. This implementation entails many
overheads and limitations such as the weight, area, and power overheads of the host PC, and
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the noisy bandwidth-bound communication medium. The sustainability of the entire PC
components becomes another hurdle to worry about.

The proposed architecture, however, is not limited to this implementation, and those software
stubs are likely to perform better should they be implemented on the same chip where the
organic layer they monitor resides. Thankfully, most of the recent FPGAs come equipped
with a general purpose microprocessor on chip such as IBM PowerPC. If GA is carried out
on the on-chip processor, and uses the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP) for faster
reconfiguration, this will naturally yield a much faster evolution and smaller MTTR and
consequently better system sustainability. Having that done, on-chip software stubs faulttolerance becomes another horizon to explore.

ii.

Fault Tolerant Golden Element:

Within the autonomic computing context, golden elements which represent a single point of
failure are not tolerable. However, eliminating them given the numerous probable fault
scenarios is not possible. The existence of single points of failure in the system reduces its
reliability and could jeopardize its chances to demonstrate its organic properties. Although
we cannot eliminate the golden elements from the organic system, we can still minimize their
effect by minimizing their failure articulation probability. Such state can be achieved by
creating a cross-monitoring capability among the system‟s golden elements.

In the proposed organic architecture, the Autonomic Element (AE) is a golden element within
the Organic Unit (OU). Therefore, the organic architecture described in this dissertation
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enables the cognitive layer to catch potential problems within the AEs and reconfigure with
alternative bitstreams to work-around the issue. This approach will be limited by the capacity
of the alternative bitstreams. A better approach to pursue is by leveraging the identical AEs
of the multiple OUs on the same chip into a triplex configuration similar to the current FE
configuration. This will enable AE intrinsic evolutionary refurbishment. Similarly, the
identical AE design property leveraged to investigate cycling one AE temporally to monitor
all the OUs within a chip. The scheduling of the AE monitoring time allocation to the various
OUs can be prioritized according to the criticality of the task the OU performes.

iii.

CGT-Pruned GA with Multiple Faults:

CGT-Pruned GA repair technique was evaluated for a single fault scenario. Nevertheless, as
time goes by, the system is likely to get hit with more faults and consequently the culprit
resources number increases. This implies that a wider portion of the un-useful evolution
search space will likely be pruned out which leads to even higher convergence speedup
advantage.

iv.

Sustainability Model for Multi-Phase Missions:

Many missions are staged into multiple phases. Each phase may have its specific availability
and performance needs

and may experience different

deployment environment

characteristics. The sustainability model shall be further extended to cover multi-phase
missions where different Availability, Quality, and Longevity trade-offs take place in each
phase.
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Table 23. Actors Interacting with AES

Actor
CLS (Autonomous
Supervisor)
AE (Autonomic Element)
FE (Functional Element)
PM (performance monitor)
RM (Refurbishment
Manager)
Timer

Description
This is the module from the cognitive layer interacting with the AES
stub.
AE Hardware circuitry that resides on the FPGA, communicates
with AES via USB port.
Functional module that resides on the FPGA.
The module in the cognitive layer responsible for organic layer
performance monitoring.
Another software module responsible for refurbishing AEs and FEs
upon the request of CLS.
Responsible for firing periodical events to the AES to synchronize
its functionality with other modules.

Table 24. AES and FES Use Cases

Use Case

Actor

Description

Establish Connection with AE

AE

The AES should be able to establish connection with the AEs through USB
ports. This connection will be used later to carry messages between the organic
layer and the AES.

Send Message to AE

AE

AES needs to send messages to AEs in order to send commands, request
status, and control the overall operation of the organic layer.

Receive Message from AE

AE

AES should be able to poll the USB port for messages coming from the
hardware, including reporting and status messages.

Establish Connection with CLS

CLS

Send Message to CLS

CLS

This connection should be initialized for communication between the AES and
the cognitive layer.
AES collects statistics and reporting messages from the organic layer and
pushes it to the CLS through the available socket connection.

Receive Message from CLS

CLS

Control messages from the CLS to the organic layer is collected by the AES
and marshaled with the required parameters to the AEs and RM.

Initiate Refurbishment

RM

The AES should be able to command the RM to start the refurbishment
process; all the settings should be specified along with the bit files that have to
be used.
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Use Case

Actor

Description

Read Refurbishment Results

RM

Check Queue

Timer

Establish Connection with FE

FE

Receive Message from FE

FE

Upon refurbishment completion, the RM reports the results to the AES who in
turn sends them to the CLS to facilitate decision making in the cognitive layer.
The AES checks the message queues periodically searching for new messages
from the various modules; this event should be triggered by a timer module that
can be customized to support different level of responsiveness.
The FES should be able to establish connection with the FEs through USB
ports. This connection will be used later to carry messages between the organic
layer and the FES.
FES should be able to poll the USB port for messages coming from the FEs.

Establish Connection with PM

PM

This connection should be initialized for communication between the FES and
the cognitive layer.

Send Message to PM

PM

FES sends functional output from the organic layer and pushes it to the PM
through the available socket connection.

Figure 37 depicts the Use-Case diagram of the AES and FES. Unified Modeling Language
(UML) notation is used where the ovals represent use cases. The multiplicity of the relations is
shown on the arrows to describe the numerical aspect of the relation.

149

1

Establish
Connection with AE

1..
*
1..
*

Establish
Connection with FE
1

1

1..
*

Send Message to AE
1..*

Receive Message
from FE

AE
1

1..*

1

FE

Recieve Message
from AE

1
1

Establish
Connection with AS
Establish
Connection with PM

1
1

1

1
Send Message to AS

1
AS

Send Message to PM
1

1
Recieve Message
from AS

1

1

Initiate
Refurbishment

1
1
RM

Read Refurbishment
Results

1
1..*
Check Queue
Timer

Figure 37. AES Use-Case Diagram
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Table 25. AES and FES Class Description

Class

Description

Connection

Responsible for managing the physical communication with the external modules. It
supports two implementations (USB, Socket).

CommunicationController

Manages one or many connections (e.g., multiple USB connections to different AEs).
Instantiated and used by the module managers.
Simple class that carries message information.

Message
Timer

Responsible for firing cyclic events to module managers to support periodic processes
(e.g., polling messages, manage inbox, etc.)

Dispatcher
AEManager

CLSManager

Implements asynchronous communication between module managers.
Holds detailed view of the organic layer (could be read from a configuration file that
contains the organic layer structure such as available AEs/FEs and their addresses)
and manages sending and receiving messages to/from AEs.
Responsible for sending and receiving messages to/from CLS.

RMManager

Controls initiating refurbishment and reporting results.

FEManager

Holds details of the FEs in the organic layer and manages receiving functional output
from the FEs.
Responsible for sending messages to the PM in the CL.

PMManager
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Table 26. Component Interactions

Component

Organic Unit

FES

AES

Description
This is the smallest integrated unit in the organic layer. It consists of one AE and three FEs.
Initially, it is configured with only two FEs online and one cold-spare standby. If discrepancy is
detected, the AE switches to TMR mode (i.e., puts the cold-spare FE online and implements a
voting scheme).
An FPGA can accommodate one or more organic unites based on the unit complexity and the
FPGA resources.
Functional Element Stub: This is a software component responsible for polling the messages
from the FEs through a physical link (e.g., USB connection) and delivering them to the PM
module in the cognitive layer through sockets.
Autonomic Element Stub: This is a software component responsible for polling the messages
from the AEs through a physical link (e.g., USB connection) and delivering them to the CLS
module in the cognitive layer through sockets.

RM

Refurbishment Manager: This is a software component responsible for running refurbishment
algorithms (e.g., Genetic Algorithm).

CLS

Cognitive Layer Stub. This is a software component in the cognitive layer responsible for
delivering status messages and refactoring instructions to/from the cognitive layer
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Table 27. FES Connection Protocol

Protocol Attribute

Description

Implementation

Socket communication

Purpose

Report functional outputs of organic units

Direction

Unidirectional from FES to CLS

Communication Type

Asynchronous (Producer/Consumer)

Message Type

String

D bn-1
Message Format

b2 b1 b0
n-bit Functional
Output

TIME_STAMP

TBD

Discrepancy
Bit

Message Trigger(s)

Functional output ready

Message Description

Message sent from the FES to the CLS at every functional output
production. The Discrepancy bit is asserted upon discrepant outputs
indicating the invalidity of the current output.
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Table 28. AES Connection Messages

No.

Message Name

Description

From CLS To AES
1

FE_STATUS_REQUEST

Message sent from the CLS to the organic layer to query the status of
any FE.

2

TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST

The CLS sends this message whenever TMR is needed; this could be
due to performance degradation.

3

REFURBISH _REQUEST

The CLS sends this message when refurbishment is needed, either
due to faulty FE(s) or performance degradation below mission
requirements.

4
5

FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST
PING _REQUEST

The CLS sends this message whenever FE status change is needed.
The CLS sends this message to check the health of the AE(s)

RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST

The CLS sends this message to reconfigure an FE and change its
functionality.

6
7

DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST

The CLS sends this message to revert TMR mode into the normal
duplex mode upon successful repair or broken FE decommission.

8

GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST

The CLS sends this message to request the configuration of the
organic layer.

From AES To CLS
9

DISCREPANCY_REPORT

This message is sent when an AE detects discrepancy among its FEs.
The message contains the input that articulated the discrepancy along
with the FE configuration at that time (TMR or duplex).

10

FE_STATUS_REPORT

Response to message 1 and 4

11

TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT

Either as a response to message 2 or an acknowledgment of the TMR
activation in case it is autonomously done by the organic layer.
Response to message 3. The message includes the final fitness of the
refurbished AE(s).

12

REFURBISH _REPORT

13

PING_REPLY

Response to Message 5

14
15

RECONFIGURATION_REPORT
DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT

Response to Message 6
Response to Message 7

16

OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT

Response to Message 8
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Table 29. AES Connection Messages

Protocol Attribute

Description

Implementation

Socket communication

Direction

Bidirectional

Communication Type

CLSynchronous (Producer/Consumer)

Message – 1
Message Name
Message Type

DISCREPANCY_REPORT
String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG_ CODE

Message Format

5

AE_ID

Log2 |AE|

FE_ID

TMR

FAULT_ ARTICULATION
_ INPUT

TIME_STAMP

2

1

n- bit Functional Input

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Discrepancy detected by the AE

Message Description

Message sent whenever an AE detects discrepancy among its FEs. The
TMR flag is used to specify the configuration of the organic unit when
the discrepancy was detected. A TMR flag value of 1 indicates that the
3 FEs were simultaneously used in voting scheme, and the FE_ID in
this case specifies the discrepant FE, whereas a 0 value indicates the
original configuration of two online FEs and one Cold-spare standby
(duplex mode), the FE_ID reflects the address of the cold-standby FE in
this case. The n-bit FAULT_ARTICULATION_INPUT provides the CLS
with the actual input that articulated the discrepancy; this could be
useful for the CLS and/or RM to regenerate the fault scenario during the
refurbishment process.
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Protocol Attribute

Description

Message – 2
Message Name

FE_STATUS_REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic.

Message Description

This message is sent from the CLS to the organic layer to query the
status of any number of FEs. The addresses of the AEs/FEs can be
specifically provided to target specific FE or a broadcast address (e.g.
address zero) can be used to query multiple FEs. For example, if the
AE_ID is 3 and the FE_ID is 0, the AE that has the address of (3) has to
respond with three FE_STATUS_REPORT messages (Message-3) for
each one of its FEs. Also, if the AE_ID field is zero and the FE_ID is 2,
all AEs in the organic layer have to report the status of their FE with the
address 2. It is apparent that an FE_STATUS__REQUEST message
with both AE_ID and FE_ID fields filled with zero means a full broadcast
to the organic layer to send the status of every single FE to the
cognitive layer.
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Protocol Attribute

Description

Message – 3
Message Name

FE_STATUS_REPORT

Message Type

String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG_CODE

AE_ID

FE_ID

STATUS

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

2

Log2 |AE|

3

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-2

Message Description

Responding to Message-2, an AE has to send one
FE_STATUS_REPORT message per FE to the CLS. Contrary to
message-2, The AE_ID and FE_ID fields cannot specify a broadcast
address in this message; they have to explicitly indicate the sender
identity.

Message – 4
Message Name
Message Type

TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST
String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _CODE

AE_ID

TIME _STAMP

Message Format
5

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

Log2 |AE|

TBD

CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. It could be due to
performance degradation below the mission requirements for this
organic unit (FEs and AE).
CLS can send this message to one/all AEs in the organic layer to trigger
TMR configuration activation. The targeted AE(s) respond by activating
TMR among FEs and confirm back by sending Message-5
(TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT)
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Protocol Attribute

Description

Message – 5
Message Name

TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT

Message Type

String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG _ CODE

AE _ID

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

- Response to Message-4
- Autonomous response taken by the AE itself.

Message Description

As described in message-4, this message is a confirmation from AE to
CLS that TMR has been configured among the three FEs as requested
or a notification to the CLS that the AE has autonomously activated the
TMR mode.

Message – 6
Message Name

REFURBISH _REQUEST

Message Type
Message Source

String
CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG_CODE

AE_ ID

FE_ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE |

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. It could be due to
one of the FEs was reported faulty, or due to performance degradation
below the mission requirements.

Message Description

This message is sent from the CLS whenever refurbishment is needed.
For example this call can initiate running GA to repair faulty FE(s). The
same principle of broadcast addressing described in Message-2 is
applicable to this message.
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Protocol Attribute

Description

Message – 7
Message Name

REFURBISH _REPORT

Message Type

String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG_ CODE

AE_ID

FE_ID

FITNESS_ VALUE

TIME_STAMP

2

Log2|Fitness|

TBD

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

Message Trigger(s)

Refurbishment process is finished.

Message Description

This message is sent from the AE to CLS upon refurbish completion.
The final fitness value of the refurbished FE is reported in the message
so that it can be used in future mission-specific decision making.

Message – 8
Message Name

FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _CODE

Message Format

5

AE _ID

Log2 |AE|

FE_ID

STATUS

TIME _ STAMP

2

Log 2 |STATUS|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

- FE is put under-repair.
- FE was refurbished and the CLS decides that it is eligible to be put
online.
- FE has failed to be refurbished and claimed un-reparable and hence
should be decommissioned

Message Description

The CLS can send this message to change the status of FE(s).
Broadcasting can be used to specify more than one FE in a single
command, provided that they will be changed to the same status. The
target AE will respond by changing the status of the addressed FE(s)
and send a confirmation of the change to the CLS (as described in
Message-2).
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Message – 9
Message Name

PING _REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG_ CODE

AE_ID

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

TBD

Log2 |AE|

Message Trigger(s)

CLS checks that the AE is alive.

Message Description

The Ping message is used by the CLS to check the health of the AEs to
check if it is minimally responsive. The broadcast addressing can be
used to ping all the AEs in the organic layer. AEs respond to the Ping
message by sending a PING_REPLY to the CLS (As described in
Message-10)

Message – 10
Message Name
Message Type

PING_REPLY
String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG_ CODE

AE_ID

TIME _ STAMP

Message Format
5

Log2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-9

Message Description

This message is sent from the AE to the CLS as a reply for the
PING_REQUEST (Message-9).
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Message – 11
Message Name

RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _ CODE

Message Format

Message Trigger(s)

Message Description

5

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

2

Log 2 |AE|

TIME_STAMP

TBD

CONFIG_ID
_

TBD

- AE is not responding properly (Any failure to respond such as ping
failure)
- CLS decided to change the functionality of the organic unit.
This message is sent from the CLS to the AE(s) to change the
configuration of the corresponding FE(s). The broadcast addressing can
be used in this message. The AE will respond by downloading the
requested configuration and reply with the
RECONFIGURATION_REPORT message (Message-12)

Message – 12
Message Name
Message Type

RECONFIGURATION_REPORT
String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-11

Message Description

This message is a response to the RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST
(Message-11).
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Message – 13
Message Name

DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Take one FE offline in order to: refurbish, decommission, or switch back
to normal duplex operation due to fault recovery achievement.

Message Description

As the CLS has the capability to instruct AES to switch to TMR mode
(Message-4), it can also switch it back to duplex mode under the
situations mentioned above in (Message Triggers). FE_ID field specifies
the FE module that will be taken offline (the other two FEs will be
running in duplex mode)

Message – 14
Message Name
Message Type

DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT
String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

FE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

2

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

Response to Message-13

Message Description

Once the AE changes the configuration to duplex mode, it reports back
the new configuration to the CLS, the FE_ID fields indicates the offline
FE.
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Message – 15
Message Name

GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST

Message Type

String

Message Source

CLS

Message Destination

AES

MSG _ CODE

AE _ ID

TIME_STAMP

Message Format
5

Log 2 |AE|

TBD

Message Trigger(s)

CLS initiated when it needs information about how the organic layer is
organized

Message Description

The CLS sends this message to request the configuration of the
Organic Layer.

Message – 16
Message Name

OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT

Message Type

String

Message Source

AES

Message Destination

CLS

Message Format

Adjacency list

Message Trigger(s)

Response to message-15

Message Description

The AES sends this message to report the configuration of the Organic
Layer, the organization of the organic units is sent in the format of an
adjacency list.
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Table 30. Detail of TDDB Lifetime in Years of Each Device [72]

166

Table 31. 90nm FPGA MTTF [71]

a: TDDB

b: EM
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